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ID 1485 | SOCIAL HOUSING AND REHABILITATION OF CENTRAL AREAS: THE EXPERIENCE OF ZEIS 3 IMPLEMENTATION IN SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL

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ABSTRACT: The debate on urban interventions in central areas is probably one of the most controversial issues among architects and planners. Depending on how state and market act on the production of space, the development of certain urban areas occurs or their decay. In response to the decline process, the governments of several cities of the world have been developing urban policies of intervention in these central areas, basically in two ways: through their eradication, or through their rehabilitation. Recently the implementation of social housing policies has been defended as a strategy to cope with city centre decline. The aim of this paper is to analyse the case of São Paulo, Brazil. Over the last hundred and fifty years it has grown very quickly, presenting both rise and decline processes. Since the 1970s the municipality has been implementing several plans in order to revert the decline, and recently with the aim to provide social housing. The paper is divided into this abstract and four more sections. First a little historic appraisal of the public responses to the decline process, followed by a view on the rise and decline of São Paulo city centre. The next section will analyse the policies proposed and implemented by the municipality for the centre and then analyse the implementation of ZEIS 3, a type of inclusionary zoning, searching to understand it results in a rehabilitation process. This paper is partially result of a post-doctoral research project financed by FAPESP (São Paulo State Research Support Foundation), Process # 2015/26447-7.

1 URBAN POLICIES FOR CENTRAL AREAS

The debate on urban interventions in central areas is probably one of the most controversial issues among architects and planners. Since cities are socially constructed, they are constantly changing, growing or declining in response to changes in the societies in which they are embedded. Depending on how the state and the market interact on the production of space, the development of certain urban areas occurs, with the appearance of new economic activities and social classes, or their decay, with the end of these activities, economic decline and migration (Couch, 1990).

In response to this process, the local authorities of several cities have been developing urban policies for intervention in these central areas basically in two ways (Nobre, 1994): the first would be its eradication, caused by the renovation of its built environment; the second would be its rehabilitation, through improvement projects.

After World War II, the consolidation of Modern Urbanism and Architecture, following the modernist precepts of the CIAMs and the Athens Charter, led to the adoption of reconstruction policies based on the renewal of the urban fabric (OECD, 1983). The need to affirm the birth of a new period and the break with the painful recent past, technological development and capital inflow from the Marshall Plan allowed the reconstruction of several European cities, much influenced by Le Corbusier's ideas.

The United States, despite not having suffered from the destruction of the war, also adopted the process of urban renewal in order to combat the process of "degradation" of the central areas (Rapkin, 1980). In order to eradicate the slums in these areas, generally residence of the poor afro-descendant population, the Federal Government established the Federal Housing Act in 1949, which provided federal resources for

the expropriation and remodelling of these areas and the construction of peripheral housing complexes. The harmful physical effects and social impacts on these excluded groups made this law to be known as the Federal Bulldozer (Anderson, 1962).

A questioning of this process started in the 1960s. The destruction of pre-existing urban form and the removal of settled communities, usually low-income, ended up causing strong popular reactions, causing urban riots in many cities. Urban and sociological studies were made, criticizing the effects and consequences of this process due to the problems arising from social ties disruption and the expulsion of areas with a concentration of jobs and services (Jones, 1979; Knox, 1982). At the same time, the awareness of the environmental burden related to the destruction of a sound built environment and the historical importance of the urban fabric also questioned these interventions (Couch, op. cit.).

From the 1970s on, new urban studies began to work with the concepts of building rehabilitation and community development in various European cities, such as Amsterdam, Bologna, Madrid, Rotterdam and Venice. In the United States, the Federal Government, under pressure of the booming of the Civil Rights Movement, launched the Model Cities program, which provided assistance to cities and community groups to rehabilitate deteriorated areas occupied by low-income population. (Rapkin, op. cit.)

Recently the studies for central area rehabilitation have been working with the concept of compact mixed use cities. One of the main aspects of this concept is the construction of social housing as an important element in this process. In addition to central area repopulation, social housing construction has a social justice aspect, as it allows low-income class access to the city, jobs and services.

2 SÃO PAULO CENTRAL AREA RISE AND DECLINE

The São Paulo Metropolitan Region (SPMR) is located in the Southeast region of Brazil, standing out as the largest Brazilian urban agglomeration with 19 million inhabitants, of which 11 million in the city of São Paulo (MSP) in 2010 (IBGE, 2010). Besides the MSP, it is formed by other 38 municipalities, extending by eight thousand and five hundred square kilometres, equal to 10% of the national territory. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was € 256 billion in 2010, accounting for 19% of the Brazilian GDP (74% in services and 26% in industry). Despite all this wealth, the metropolis has presented an uneven development, whereas 63% of the residents earn less than five MW – minimum wages (less than € 1,144) and only 6% earn more than twenty (more than € 4,576).

The Metropolis developed due to the concentration of economic activities related to great cycles: coffee trade with Europe from late 19th century on; import substitution industrialization from the 1930s on; deindustrialization with tertiary sector growth since the 1980s. Historically, middle and high income populations have settled in the most central areas of the metropolis, where commercial activities, jobs, services, public equipment and the best infrastructure are concentrated (Villaça, 1997). On the other hand, the low-income sectors were “expelled” to less privileged areas in relation to these factors, living in a high level of precariousness in slums, favelas and peripheral illegal settlements.

As seen in the previous section, the rise and decline of urban areas change according to how the State and the market intervene on the city. In the case of São Paulo, the central area rise and decline occurred over the last century, following the metropolis rapid and recent development. During the first three centuries, the city remained in the adjacencies of the historical hill, site of its foundation. Coffee plantation and export from São Paulo State and European immigration in the middle of 19th century resulted in an intense economic development with impact on the urbanization process.

The accumulation of capital was drained to the real estate sector, resulting in urban sprawl over the adjacent farms along the railroad. The economic development brought a greater division of labour and social stratification resulting in spatial segregation. The city expanded in all directions, but selectively. To the west, the terrains of slightly wavy topography and rising altitude were appropriated by the elite. The lowlands, to the east segregated by the Tamanduateí floodplain and the railroad, were left to the low-income class.

The Santos-Jundiaí railroad construction caused the valorisation of the Northwest sector, as the the Luz Rail Station made the region the main gateway to the city. During this period, urban planning in Brazil was

influenced by European experiences, resulting in central area improvement plans for the main cities of the country (Leme, 1999). Following these concepts, the main public works of the time valued the Central Area, through the construction of new avenues and expansion of the existing ones, construction of parks, gardens, squares and public buildings, such as the remodelling of Anhangabaú Valley, the construction of the Patriarca Square and the Municipal Theatre, as in figure 1.

The urban legislation of this period reinforced the valorisation of the central area. The Code of Postures, which was the main existing legislation, prohibited the installation of so-called “nuisance” practices, such as tenements and slaughterhouses, in the “city perimeter”, in an attempt to keep this area exclusive to the São Paulo elite (Rolnik, 1997). At the end of the nineteenth century, the expansion of the upper classes rose toward South, developing Vila Buarque and Higienópolis neighbourhoods, reaching Paulista Avenue, moving away from the working-class districts. From the early twentieth century, this expansion went south towards the Pinheiros river floodplain, in an Ebenezer Howard “garden city” model development.



Figure 1 – Anhangabaú Valley in 1920s.

Source: http://smul.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/historico_demografico/img/1920/teatro-sao-jose-grande.jpg

From the 1920s on, São Paulo has consolidated its position as the industrial centre of Brazil. High rise development and commercial specialization caused the centre loss of residential function. The 1930 Avenues Plan resulted in the construction of a series of radial roads, reinforcing the city centre valorisation and low-income peripheral sprawl. From the 1950s to 1960s, Paulista Avenue became the new elite centre, while the Central Area became the popular centre, being progressively abandoned by the bourgeoisie.

Between the 1980s and 2000s, the centre decline was intensified as large public and private investments developed a “new metropolitan centre” in the Southwest Zone of the city, along Pinheiros River embankment (Nobre, 2000). These investments resulted in a large increase of vacant commercial buildings in the Central Area, which old buildings could not compete with the new development in those regions. Between 1990 and 1998, while the city's vacant commercial stock grew by 32%, the Centre vacant commercial stock increased by 55%, reaching almost 600 thousand square meters, 60% of the city commercial vacant buildings, though the Centre concentrates only 40% of the built stock (Nobre, op. cit.).

The City Centre decline was accompanied by the continuing low-income peripheral sprawl. Between 1991 and 2000, peripheral districts and municipalities, located in environmental protected areas (mountain ranges and watershed areas), gained 360 thousand inhabitants, with a growth rate of 6.3% per year, well above the metropolis average of 1.6% (Nobre, 2004).

Paradoxically, during this period the central districts were the ones with the highest population decline in spite all the existing infrastructure (São Paulo, 2006). From 1980 to 2000 the ten central districts lost almost 200 thousand residents. This led to an increase in vacant residential properties, growing 55.6%, from 270 thousand to 420 thousand, specially the residential vacancy that went from 10.6 to 14.5% of the building stock. Around 40 thousand residential vacant units were located in the central area districts (9.2%

of total residential vacancy). According to IBGE data, the ten central districts were among those with the highest residential vacancy rate, with an average of 18.4% of vacant properties, as seen in table 1.

	Population		Growth	Households	Vacant	Vacancy Rate
	1980	2000				
Metropolitan São Paulo	12,588,725	17,878,703	1.8%	6,531,119	728,171	13.1%
City of São Paulo	8,493,226	10,434,282	1.0%	3,554,820	420,327	14.5%
Bela Vista	85,416	63,143	-1.5%	33,848	5,479	21.9%
Bom Retiro	47,588	26,569	-2.9%	10,807	1,821	21.8%
Bris	38,630	11,505	-2.3%	11,622	2,789	26.8%
Cambuci	44,851	28,620	-2.2%	11,370	1,910	19.5%
Consolação	77,338	54,301	-1.8%	29,577	3,694	18.1%
Liberdade	82,472	61,850	-1.4%	29,392	5,283	20.9%
Pari	26,968	14,521	-3.0%	5,817	1,223	23.3%
República	60,999	47,459	-1.2%	30,849	7,007	25.5%
Santa Cecília	94,542	71,111	-1.4%	36,171	6,343	21.5%
Sé	32,965	20,106	-2.4%	11,410	3,055	29.4%
Total Central Districts	591,769	412,185	-1.8%	210,863	38,604	18.4%
Central Districts Population Loss		-179,584				

Table 1 - Population growth and household vacancy in Metropolitan, City and City Centre of São Paulo.
 Source: São Paulo, 2001b.

3 PLANS AND PROJECTS FOR SÃO PAULO CITY CENTRE

The first responses of the Municipal Government to the City Centre decline date from to the 1970s. At that time, the plans had a strong emphasis on issues of historical heritage and traffic control, based on the idea of urban rehabilitation, proposing the expropriation and restoration of historical interest buildings and the creation of a pedestrian sidewalk circulation system approximately seven kilometers long (Emurb, 1979).

In the 1980s, despite various proposals nothing was implemented. The diagnoses elaborated by such studies already identified a centrifugal growth/peripheral expansion and proposed the population densification in the central area, through zoning revision. At that time, the only actions implemented were the construction of tunnels that deviated through-traffic from the central area, recreating the Anhagabaú Valley Park and the restoration of the Municipal Theatre.

Luiza Erundina's Office (1989/1992) proposed a "Return to the City Centre". In addition to finalizing Anhagabaú Valley works, it promoted several urban projects public competitions for the neighbourhoods around in the Central Area, implemented a program of slum tenements improvement of and brought the City Hall from the middle class area to the City Centre, seeking to move the axis of municipal power to the popular city.

It dates from this office the Anhagabaú Urban Operation, a project that aimed at City Centre improvement, making better use of vacant and underutilized properties, encouraging the preservation of historical heritage and residential use in the area. It provided exceptions to the land use legislation and the building code, allowing higher FAR (floor area ratios) and the transfer of development rights for listed buildings.

Although all the benefits proposed, there was few interest of the real estate market, since until the end of the project in 1994, only seven proposals had occurred, consuming only 13% of the additional building stock (Nobre, 2009). The higher densities allowed in the new of FARs did not constitute sufficient incentive to attract new investors to the City Centre.

The following two offices, Paulo Maluf (1993/1996) and Celso Pitta (1997/2000), despite continuing the discussions about the central area, changed their focus favouring the development of large real estate projects in the city's Southwest Zone, where the highest income population lives, concentrating heavy public investments in several road works and removal of favelas, valuing even more urban development in this area.

Despite this, it was during this period that the PROCENTRO – City Centre Urban Requalification Program was created. The diagnosis presented in its creation document defined as the main problems of the Centre deterioration the difficulty of traffic access, circulation and parking; obsolescence and insufficiency of the real estate stock and deficiency of personal and patrimonial security (São Paulo, 1993). The proposals were a result of the discussions of the municipal government with central area businessmen who wanted to reverse the process of Centre decline, bringing back the elites. Despite all the incentive to urban renewal contained in the PROCENTRO projects, it also caused little interest from real estate market.

The Martha Suplicy administration (2001/2004), instead of just stimulating real estate development as an urban renewal strategy, decided to propose a new plan for the Centre, based on functional and social diversity, seeking to emphasize housing, employment, culture, leisure and education activities in this region. Social housing implementation became one of the main strategies of this plan.

For that reason, this office changed the composition of the PROCENTRO council, now coordinated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (SEHAB) with a more diversified representation of the society than the previous one, adding representatives of professional institutions (lawyers, architects and engineers) and also from the housing movement. In 2003, after signing a € 145 million loan with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Central Area Rehabilitation Program – Ação Centro was launched coordinated by the Municipal Urbanisation Company (EMURB) responsible for City Hall major works.

The Ação Centro Program contained five lines of action:

1. Reversal of the real estate devaluation and recovery of the residential function;
2. Transformation of the economic and social profile;
3. Rehabilitation of the urban environment;
4. Improvement of transport and mobility;
5. Institutional strengthening of the Municipality.

The reversal of the real estate devaluation and recovery of the residential function would be obtained through the revision of the legislation, implementing the Social Interest Special Zone – Type 3 (ZEIS-3). The ZEIS-3 is a type of inclusionary zoning where at least 40% of new development area must be social housing units. The type 3 were enacted in areas with vacant land or underutilized buildings in the City Centre.

In order to reduce vacancy, the 2002 Strategic Master Plan defined that any building with more than 80% of its area unoccupied for more than five years in the central area could be expropriated by the municipality if it remained vacant. This was in accordance to the 1988 Federal Constitution that defined the conditions of urban property social function.

The “Living in the Centre” Program (Programa Morar no Centro) was also implemented, promoting social housing in the central area, handing by the end of 2004 many social housing developments¹ and favela upgrading financed by the Federal Saving Bank (CEF – Caixa Econômica Federal).

Complementing these actions, the Law of Selective Incentives was enacted providing tax exemptions for new companies and development in the central area, and both the Municipal and the State Government brought 11,500 public servants from various municipal and state departments to work in the City Centre, resulting in the recovery of local commerce, specifically bars, restaurants and small services.

The next office, Serra/Kassab (2005/2012) revised the Ação Centro program, causing a reversal in the ongoing process. The Nova Luz Project proposed the expropriation of several blocks near the Luz Rail Station, known as “Crackland”, to promote an urban renewal process based on an information technology pole development, many poor families were evicted from vacant buildings, and the City Hall pardoned millionaire debts in property municipal taxes of several vacant buildings.

¹ Asdrubal do Nascimento, Baronesa de Porto Carrero, Olarias, Residencial Parque do Gato, Riachuelo, Riskalah Jorge and Senador Feijó social housing developments.

4 SOCIAL HOUSING PRODUCTION IN THE CITY CENTRE AND THE REVISION OF THE ZEIS 3

Despite the changes in the “Living in the Centre” program, some social housing production occurred, often by the initiative of the residents themselves and not so much of the government. According to the Instituto Polis (2013), since the 1990s there have been 44 occupations of vacant buildings, accommodating almost 10 thousand families in the central area. However, the response from the government was three times smaller than the problem, since 2001 only 2,833 housing units were produced, of which 709 were financed by CEF, 858 by CDHU (State of São Paulo Housing and Urban Development Company) and 1,266 by the Municipality.

Some old buildings were renovated for the low-income population and the works were carried out by small contractors (Gatti, 2015). In their research on the implementation of the ZEIS 3, Samora & Hirata (2013) state that between 2001 and 2010 10,317 units were launched with 70 square meters of floor space and maximum price of € 1,800/m². Of this total, 3,567 units were located in ZEIS, or 35% of the total. The highest concentration of construction permits in ZEIS 3 occurred between 2006 and 2010, when 2,673 units were launched, 56% of the total period. According to them, new private development followed middle-class models because as 90% of the buildings constructed are in tower blocks of more than 10 floors and 44% of buildings have underground parking areas. By these parameters it can be affirmed that the population of low income was not met as predicted before. On the other hand, public developments followed the traditional patterns of social housing, as 44% of them are five floor high buildings to avoid lift costs.

The 2002 Master Plan earmarked one million square meters as ZEIS 3. By 2013, 51% of this area had already been consumed for real estate projects. Of this total, only 23.8% was built for public social housing; 22.1% was lower middle-class private dwelling; 22.2% was high-income development and 31.9% social facilities. This process of rehabilitation of the centre resulted in an increase of 63,800 new residents and the construction of 40,700 new homes in apartment buildings (Kara-José, 2013). The 2002 São Paulo Strategic Master Plan (Law 13,430/2002) was scheduled to be revised in 2006, but the proposal for revision was not completed in the last two municipal administrations. The review was started in the first year of Fernando Haddad office (2013/2016) through a broad discussion process and it was approved on July 31, 2014.

The master plan revision would be an opportunity to review the implementation of the urban planning instruments detailed in the 2002 Plan. Many of them did not achieve their goals in the way they were designed because they were not properly applied by the administration that followed its approval. In the case of ZEIS one can identify multiple aspects of conceptual misunderstanding, the inapplicability of its fundamental principles and the need for revisions considering the urban transformations over the last decade.

The new 2016 Master Plan brought significant advances in the viability of housing for low-income families: it increased from 964 to 2,542 the total number of ZEIS perimeters and from 145 to 478 the perimeters of ZEIS 3, destined almost exclusively for families earning less than three MW (€ 729). The most important change was the enactment of mechanisms to create land banking for the production of social housing, through the ‘Solidarity Quota’, resources derived from the large scale urban development projects (called Urban Operations) and the allocation of resources from the Urban Development Fund (FUNDURB). With the ‘Solidarity Quota’, any enterprise with a computable area above 20 thousand square meters must donate 10% of its built area for social housing, on site or on other land, or donate land equivalent to 10% of the total area project or donate an amount in cash equivalent to it to the FUNDURB (Gatti, 2015).

The creation of a land inventory for housing production is one of the major advances of the New Master Plan proposal, since it allows the municipality to face one of the greatest difficulties of housing management, which is to acquire land that is well located and therefore highly valued for social housing production. The areas earmarked as ZEIS are intended to guarantee the permanence of the low income population in their places of origin and to reserve parcels of land throughout the urban perimeter for the production of social housing, especially in the central areas, where the price of land makes it quite impossible the access to housing for the poorest population.

However, during the ten years ZEIS implementation after the 2002 Master Plan, the production of social housing in well-located areas only benefited families earning less than three times the minimum wage when was associated with public housing programs, produced on a small scale. On the other hand, the private market, which was responsible for the production of social housing and lower middle-income housing in combined enterprises in ZEIS, limited the service to families with incomes between 5 and 6 MW, since there was no obligatory percentage to attend lower income families.

With the new Master Plan, two social interest income brackets were created: Social Housing 1 (HIS 1) from 0 to 3 MW; and Social Housing 2 (HIS 2), from 3 to 6 MW. Priority was given to housing production for HIS 1: at least 60% in ZEIS 1, 2, 3 And 4; in order to guarantee the housing service for the poorest, who are majority of those who inhabit the perimeters of ZEIS and the highest percentage of the housing deficit. Even so, the most vulnerable section of the population, with incomes less than one MW, may not be included in the housing program if the local authority does not assume this commitment, since there is no minimum percentage allocated to it in the perimeters of ZEIS. This was a current debate during the review of the Master Plan, which was left out of the proposal because of the difficulty in measuring this demand. It is a population that lives in slums, favelas or even in the streets, and is at the limit of informality. This demand requires a specific housing policy other than that of housing finance with transfer of ownership, in order to reverse its condition of abandonment.

Considering that social housing production in ZEIS for lower income brackets has not happened over the last ten years and that the revision of the Master Plan has sought to join efforts to this, focusing on the role the government should play in this process, the question is whether the implementation of the resources as proposed by the new Master Plan will respond to this new expectation. If a major effort has been made to earmark new perimeters of ZEIS 3 in underutilized areas occupied by precarious housing with potential for housing production, should not resources be provided for the acquisition of this land and their production? The resources of the Solidarity Quota and Urban Operations are not prioritized to be applied in areas of ZEIS. The resources of FUNDURB are destined to acquire land 'preferentially in ZEIS 3', but not necessarily. According to the Master Plan rapporteur in the City Council, councilman Nabil Bonduki, making land available outside ZEIS would further expand the stock of land, since land already earmarked as cheaper ZEIS would be more easily acquired by other instruments. However, if there is no public initiative in housing production in ZEIS, these recorded lands may be frozen and idle, which would not necessarily be a bad thing, considering that these areas would still be 'saved' for future social housing production. The aggravating factor is that these areas are constituted predominantly by a population living in slums and in a precarious housing situation and that will continue without any prospect of improvements in their housing conditions so soon. Considering these aspects, the municipality should move towards the acquisition of these areas inside the ZEIS.

Nevertheless, for the viability of acquiring land, even if not exclusively in ZEIS, there are many sources: the solidarity quota, urban operations, FUNDURB and the instruments of property social use induction (PEUC – parcelling, construction and compulsory use of land), progressive property tax for unused land and buildings, real estate consortium, municipality right of preemption and abandoned buildings and land reclamation. But there is no reserve of resources specifically for the production of new units or renovation, especially in the area of ZEIS, whether for purchase or lease.

Although public resources can be earmarked for housing production, its priority allocation in the new Master Plan is for the acquisition of land. The main rationale for this was the priority to solve the land issue, since land prices are the biggest obstacle to the production of housing and the construction can be financed by other sources, such as the My House, My Life Program (PMCMV – Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida), a Federal Program that finances housing acquisition and construction. With a land banking this difficulty would then be overcome for the production of well-located housing for the poor.

However, public policies must seek not only for financing the acquisition of housing through transfer of ownership, as it will continue to be inaccessible for the most vulnerable sections of the population, that cannot meet the requirements of formal financing, nor afford condominium expenses and new costs of formal housing, nor those whose work dynamics require residential mobility. The long-term instability of this model must also be considered, since changes in the economic or political conditions may compromise the granting of subsidies, not securing the tenure of the residents.

4.1 CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC POLICIES IN ZEIS 3 AFTER THE MASTER PLAN REVIEW

Considering the challenges for the ZEIS 3 to become viable as an instrument for access to housing and permanence of the poorest population in the central areas, a research was initiated under the current FAUUSP-FAPESP post-doctoral program to verify the performance of the municipal public policies on the areas earmarked as ZEIS after the revision of the Master Plan. Among the policies underway, three active policies on the areas of ZEIS are being verified: the application of instruments that induce the social function of property, whose notification of the PEUC will be dealt with here, the application of Municipal Fund (FUNDURB) resources and the housing policy guidelines of the new Municipal Housing Plan. The survey will still have the data updated with the end of the current municipal management and will also present the survey on the approval of enterprises in ZEIS 3 that used the rules of the new Master Plan approved in 2014, in order to verify who are the developers in ZEIS, what type of development is being produced and which demand is being met.

Regarding the application of the instruments that induce the social function of property, they were regulated by the Master Plan and implemented by the DCFSP – Department of Control of the Social Function of Property, inside the SMDU – Urban Development Municipal Department. The three instruments that induce the social function of the property will be given successively, in the following order: Parceling, Building and Compulsory Use (PEUC), Progressive Urban Territorial Property Tax (IPTU Progressive in Time) and Expropriation through Payment in Securities Public Debt, to be initiated by notification of the owner of the urban land not built (property with an area above 500 square meters with FAR equal to zero); underutilized (property with an area of more than 500 square meters whose FAR is lower than an specified value); and where there is at least 60% of the area not built for more than one year. From the notification by the PEUC, the owners will have up to one year to present a project, two years to start the works and five years to complete them. After a period of five years, the progression of the IPTU rates can be initiated, and after five more years the expropriation can be done.

ZEIS 2, 3 and 5 are considered priority areas for the application of the instruments that induce the social function of the property, among others, which also include the City Centre, amongst other areas. The PEUC notification was initiated within the ZEIS inside Urban Operations from the fiscal registry of the Finance Department. This department crosses the data from plot areas with the built-up areas, providing the data for the identification of underutilized and non-built properties. For unused real estate, there is no database, only a study on vacant buildings. The identification of the unused ones is the great challenge for the City Hall, since it is done through surveys, by a reduced team, and from the reception of information from municipal councils and social organizations, as well as more recently the implemented Collaborative Map by the City Hall to identify the social function of property ownership. From the crossing of ZEIS perimeter data with PEUC notifications made available until August 2016, it was possible to identify the notification of 116 properties reported in ZEIS 3 (of the 749 existing perimeters), compared to the 258 mobile units reported in ZEIS 5 and 544 Buildings reported outside of ZEIS, according to the following map, where it is possible to visualize the low incidence of areas of ZEIS 3 reported by PEUC.




Figure 2 – ZEIS and Buildings notified by PEUC in the central area.
 Source: elaboration by the authors

The municipality justification for the low incidence of notifications is mainly due to the characteristic of ZEIS 3, where there is a high incidence of buildings built, but not used, or of irregular use and occupied by precarious housing, such as tenements, which in practice are in use. And it is precisely these properties that do not have a database for notification, depending on surveys and cross-checks of data from sources other than the official databases.

Buildings occupied by housing movements, for example, or illegally occupied, are not notified, so that the City Hall does not legitimize repossession processes, thus constituting against the right to housing of the occupants. However, of the 544 properties reported outside ZEIS, 349 correspond to the unused category within the perimeter of the City Centre Urban Operation, which may be justified by the notification of buildings identified in the surveys.

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Ações Centro Program proposed an integrated rehabilitation of the central area with a plural vision, based on: the recovery of urban space and public buildings; the promotion of new commercial activities; the definition of a strategy of occupying vacant land with social housing; the promotion of public policies for vulnerable groups. So, the program aimed to promote both the functional and the social diversity of the area. Change of the municipal administration has considerably modified the program, focusing on urban renewal of an elitist character in the Luz region.

The attempts to fix the low income population as a resident in this region ended up encountering resistance from the owners, who did not want to lose the expectation of their land valuation. The part of the Program that was implemented managed at least to reduce physical decay and housing vacancy. The arrival of thousands of civil servants and the recovery of urban space and public buildings, despite not reversing the production dynamics of the metropolis, managed to attract private investments in the occupation and recovery of several properties, without causing a large expulsion of the low-income population. However, the current political forces seem to direct the current public policies for the Central Area to a process of renovation of its urban and social fabric.

There was an omission of the municipality that resulted in the non-implementation of the social housing units sufficient enough to meet the demand. The ZEIS 3 tool, designed specifically to meet the lowest income strata (up to 3 minimum wages), was not working and social housing in the city center continues to face many threats. The Federal My Home, My Life program implementation resumed to credit and housing financing, with a paradoxical effect, as it ended up causing a rise in land prices throughout the city and in the country (property values doubled in only five years).

Finally, a new proposal for the implementation of housing developments in the center was launched by the State and the Municipality, in the model of a PPP in which only 16% of the 20,221 units envisaged are destined to the lower income strata. So far, it seems that the occupation of empty buildings promoted by housing movements is the only way to ensure the right to stay and fight for decent housing in the central area for the lower income most vulnerable groups.

The cross-referencing and knowledge of the motivations for which there is little incidence of PEUC notifications in ZEIS 3 show us how existing instruments to guarantee the social function of property need to be articulated with a specific housing policy for precariousness existing in areas of ZEIS 3, in order to achieve the objectives inherent to the demarcation of central areas destined to the production of housing of social interest. The lack of an action policy focused on the perimeters of ZEIS can contribute to the maintenance of existing housing precariousness and to the idleness of these areas, since with the review of the Master Plan, prioritizing the perimeters of ZEIS for HIS 1 make difficult to the private market to undertake land in areas earmarked as ZEIS 3.

Considering the impossibility of the private market to produce housing for the lower income brackets in well-located areas, the new Master Plan reinforces the role of public power as a promoter of social housing in the ZEIS perimeters in order to reverse the 2002 Master Plan logic, which focused the responsibility for this production on the private market. We still have to understand how and with what housing programs the ZEIS will fulfill their role as a tool for democratizing access to land. Municipal Management will need to be committed to the acquisition of land in areas earmarked as ZEIS and in the application of resources for

a social housing production that is not only linked to housing financing, but also to the creation of a public park that promotes access to housing without transfer of ownership and guarantee the permanence of the poorest in real estate valued areas.

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ID 1520 | COLLABORATIVE HOUSING SHAPING NEW FORMS OF URBAN REGENERATION: AN ITALIAN APPROACH, THE CITY OF TURIN

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1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of "collaborative housing" encompasses various perspectives on the housing issue: from the scale of single architectural project to the broad neighbourhood dimension, involving different actors and networks and with a specific attention towards social capital and the role of the community. The main research question of this paper is whether a collaborative housing development has an effect on the larger neighbourhood. The aim is addressing the topic focusing on the urban regeneration/revitalisation effect, in order to understand if collaborative housing can be an aid against social exclusion and marginalisation related to housing distress. Therefore, the author intends to investigate whether the development of collaborative housing can be a mean to increase social cohesion and strengthen community involvement.

The Italian case study can contribute to an international comparison: Italy constitutes a particular territorial context in Europe due to the scarce investment on public housing and the irregular attention of national governments and national policies on the social housing sector. This case allows to discuss the definition of collaborative housing in a historical and place-specific perspective.

The practices developed in Turin, a metropolitan city in the North-West of Italy, show a comprehensive approach to the housing issue. In Turin public and private local stakeholders promoted a general frame of actions to deal with social exclusion and marginalisation related to housing distress. The city's approach indicates that collaborative housing can promote new forms of intervention in the urban contexts.

The city of Turin is also a national well-known pilot case for urban regeneration practices, strategic planning and integrated approach to urban problems. In the past decades the local government has fostered the debate and the development of innovative practices to tackle social and economic challenges: the city had to deal with the post-industrial phase, re-inventing its identity, image and vision for the future and managing socio-economic inequalities. Therefore, the theoretical framework implies the reflection on the national housing policies and the path-dependent dynamics taking place in the country and in the local case study.

The variety of housing practices established in Turin shapes a broad scenario of different tools and mechanisms to reach various forms of housing distress and social inequalities. The analysis of these practices contributes to both the definition of "collaborative housing" and the focus on typologies, actors and residents involvement, values and tenures. The reflections on these forms of collaborative housing are linked to their future challenges: financial and temporal sustainability in the long term, the relation with the other welfare sectors, and the role of private actors.