

## **Meeting the Challenge of Public Responsibility: Planning as Institutional Design**

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### **Abstract**

Planning must "critically reconsider...the issue of repositioning public responsibility", our Track chairs said. This can be understood in several ways. One is as responsibility *to* publics, i.e. accountability, which involves public values. Another is as responsibility *of* the public, raising structural issues. A useful approach for addressing these is institutional design (ID). What is ID, who does it and where, are answered and reviewed. How ID is done involves knowledge and methods. Public values and their relationship to ID are explored. Here "repositioning" means prioritizing accountability vs. other values e.g. efficiency or equity. Concrete implications are developed in discussion of public value promotion and conflict.

Public responsibility in the structural sense conventionally refers to the public sector: state and government. Here "repositioning" means sharing responsibility with others: private actors and the market, NGOs and civil society. ID explores repositioning alternatives of non-traditional forms of governance and service delivery: public-private partnerships, outsourcing and privatization. Selected cases show relevant ID applications; for institutions effectuating public values and as arenas to mediate value conflicts: EU institutions, metro-regional planning in New York and Queensland, and military base closing in the USA; to reposition and share public responsibility: New Towns and planned communities in Britain and the USA, groundwater conservation in Apulia. The discussion and cases show how ID can help planners to effectively reposition public responsibility.

### **1. Introduction**

Planning must "critically reconsider...the issue of repositioning public responsibility", our Track chairs said. This can be understood in several ways. One is as responsibility *to* publics, i.e. accountability, which involves public values. Another is as responsibility *of* the public, raising structural issues. A useful approach for addressing these is institutional design (ID).

Twenty years ago Judith Innes (1995) said: "Planning is institutional design", and while I would not go so far<sup>1</sup>, seeing planning as ID is how these aspects of repositioning public responsibility can be confronted. A brief introduction to ID explains what ID is, who does it and where. How ID is done raises the issues of knowledge, methods and experience.

The relationship between planning, ID and public values is explored. Planning involves public values through its remit to represent the public interest. I will show how planning as ID can promote public values, and how ID is important in mediating conflict between opposing interests espousing different public values.

Public responsibility in the structural sense conventionally refers to the public sector: state and government. Here "repositioning" means sharing responsibility with others: private actors and the market, NGOs and civil society. ID explores repositioning alternatives of non-traditional forms of governance and service delivery: public-private partnerships, outsourcing and privatization.

Selected cases show ID applications relevant for each of these aspects of public responsibility. Cases involving public values include regulating strategic installations in the UK, EU institutions, metro-regional planning in New York and Queensland, Australia, and closing military bases in the USA. Structural repositioning cases include major infrastructure planning and delivery, new towns and planned communities in the US and the UK, and groundwater allocation in Apulia. The discussion and cases show how ID can help planners to effectively reposition public responsibility.

## **2. Institutional Design**

### *2.1 What is institutional design*

To understand institutional design, we have to define institutions. Institutions are:

"the rules of the game in society...the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction...complexes of norms and technologies that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes...some have an organizational form, others exist as pervasive influences on behavior." (North, 1990, p. 3).

*Institutional design*, then, means designing institutions: devising and realizing rules, procedures and organizational structures to enable and constrain behavior and action and conform them to held values, achieve desired objectives or execute given tasks (Alexander, 2006: 4).

Many aspects of planning demand ID. There is the planning process itself, which becomes problematic when existing planning systems are flawed or inadequate. If a plan or policy includes new programs or projects, ID must say how these will be organized and implemented. When policy or plan implementation demands new organization or reorganization, legislation, regulation or new routines and procedures, ID will be needed.

### *2.2 Institutional Design – where and who?*

Three "levels" are associated with different types of institutional design:

At the highest level institutional design is applied to whole societies or addresses significant macro-societal processes and institutions. This is sometimes called "constitution writing" (e.g. the U.S. Constitution and the EU and its institutions). But it also includes major national reorganizations and innovative strategic political-administrative programs, from the Justinian legal code to Roosevelt's New Deal. The people engaged here are statesmen (if they succeed) and politicians (if they do not) and their advisors, usually administrators and lawyers.

The next level involves policy, planning and implementation structures and processes. This includes establishing and operating interorganizational networks, creating new organizations and transforming existing ones, and devising and applying incentives and constraints in the form of laws, regulations and resource deployment to develop and implement policies, programs, projects and plans. This is the level associated with planning, policy and program fields: economic development, energy, land-use planning and development control, housing, transportation and infrastructure, environmental policy, education, health and other social and human services.

At the lowest level we find intra-organizational institutional design, addressing organizational sub-units and small semi-formal or informal social units and processes: committees, teams, task forces, work groups etc. This occurs in every field, from the global corporation's "matrix" organization to the weekly poker club in Brady's Bar. Intended to ensure effective and timely task performance, this level engages anyone involved in initiating and managing an activity or process in an administrative-managerial role.

### *2.3 Knowledge and practice*

Applying theoretical knowledge to institutional design is problematic, for four reasons. 1) Ignorance: because institutional design is a relatively new concept, it can only have a limited and eclectic knowledge-base. 2) The intrinsic nature of design, for which abstract scientific models or simple technologies are useless. 3) The ecological fallacy, which makes mechanical application of universal abstract knowledge problematic. 4) The multi-party nature of institutional design: often the first challenge is to get all the involved actors to agree on their common purposes. For these reasons and others the "Handbook of Institutional Design" will never be written, and it will be useless if it is.

Nevertheless, there are some concepts and areas of knowledge that may be helpful to the practitioner. One concept is governance, where institutional economics can be a useful tool for institutional analysis. Williamson's (1985, 1995) transaction cost theory offers a repertoire of forms of governance that reflect transaction related adaptations of the "perfect" market (Alexander, 2001). At the meso-level the concept of interorganizational coordination structures (Alexander, 1995) also presents some institutional design options. At the intra-organizational micro-level, agency theory (Miller, 1992) provides concepts and models that are essential for informed intra-organizational institutional design (Alexander, 2006, pp. 8-12).

The only conscious and deliberate effort to develop a systematic method for institutional analysis and design is Ostrom's IAD (Institutional Analysis and Development) framework, which is an indispensable source for the informed practitioner. Originating in her work on common resource pool associations (Ostrom, 1990), the IAD was subsequently extended and generalized (Ostrom, 2005) to enable its application to most types of institutions.

Another model offered (more implicitly) for institutional analysis and design is the ICD (Institutional Capacity Development) framework, which its authors (De Magalhaes, Healey and Madanipour, 2002; Healey, De Magalhaes and Pendelbury, 2003) developed for their studies of local governance transformation. Recently this model was applied to the case of Government (Federal) to Government (Indigenous) planning in Coastal British Columbia (Barry, 2012).

Institutional design is a relatively new concept: hence the paradoxical contrast between limited theoretical knowledge (discussed above) and the wealth of applied institutional design experience. The practitioner can share some of this experience through relevant case-studies (Alexander, 2006, pp. 12-24).

## **3. Planning and Institutional Design: the Public Interest and Public Values<sup>2</sup>**

*The Public Interest* has always been important for planning, where it takes several forms. One is as a norm legitimating state-led land-use planning and development control. Another is as a professional

foundational principle and an ethical rule for professional practice, which is the form that applies to our discussion.

Planners in particular are required to advocate and promote the public interest, while the Public Interest is an acknowledged objective of state policy and action. In public administration it is associated with sound government and prescribed for state officials. In the judiciary, courts invoke the Public Interest as a decision criterion in private and administrative law<sup>3</sup>. There are various concepts of the Public Interest (Alexander, 2002.a).

For our purposes, the relevant ones involve dialogic-discursive applications. These include procedural concepts: a deontic approach is applied in legal adjudication, when courts define the Public Interest as compatibility with individual procedural rights; the dialogical approach is applied in the political arena when a specific substantive Public Interest is defined and operationalized for a particular case or issue, as policies develop through political discourse. A deontic approach can also combine a substantive focus with dialogic application, when administrative or legal review bodies judge a proposal's compatibility with acknowledged substantive rights<sup>4</sup>.

Bozeman (2007) used the Public Interest to introduce *Public Values* into political discourse and policy debate, as an alternative to neo-liberalism limited to economic considerations. Public values, such as justice and equity, democracy and solidarity, transparency, accountability, and effectiveness, are counter posed to private value and utilitarian efficiency. But Bozeman goes into little detail on how the Public Interest actually inserts public values into political and policy agendas.

Detailed review of different concepts of the Public Interest suggests how its applications work to introduce public values into collective decisions and actions. In the dialogic process of identifying or determining what is in the public interest in a specific context, case, or issue, the participating actors express their particular interests (which may become subjects for bargaining and debate) and justify them by appeal to their basic values, which may also be contested. These may include general public values to which various parties may give different priorities (e.g. effectiveness vs equity or accountability) and instrumental values that relate to their interests and goals for the issue at hand.

For example, in the UK National Infrastructure Commission's deliberations on approval of major strategic facilities (e.g. power stations, LNG terminals) proponents of projects cited the need for efficient energy supply to meet rising demand and support the national economy, while opponents ("greens" and local interests) countered with the public values of conservation – of natural resources and the environment – and sustainability (linked to alternative energy sources that would inhibit global warming) that would be promoted by denying the application (McKay, Murray and Macintyre, 2012). How important the link is between Public Values and the Public Interest becomes clear when we consider how many arenas there are for dialogic development of an agreed-upon Public Interest, and how often this happens. Administrative-managerial deliberation on adopting possible policies, programs or projects, administrative-regulatory review of projects submitted for permission or approval, and judicial review of disputed proposals take place almost everywhere and are happening almost all the time. This is true for the public and private sectors, and especially so for the interface between them, and applies in most societies – all those with democratic regimes that observe the rule-of-law.

When are institutions involved in these dialogic applications of the Public Interest? Their most important role is framing these discourses: all the arenas itemized above essentially serve as the institutional environment and context for the dialogic processes they host. This is clear from our examples: the corporation's management executive encapsulating private enterprise, the municipality's

budget committee and the County Planning Commission – the institution of government, and the District Circuit Court representing the legal system. Institutions also participate in the dialogic process itself, sometimes as social groupings such as economic sectors or interests, movements (e.g. "greens" or property-rights advocates) or as organizations-agencies. Institutional design, then, offers a way of effectuating public values through the institutions that channel them into collective discourse and action.

#### **4. Sharing public responsibility: the role of institutional design**

Conventional socio-economic and planning theories juxtapose planning and markets in dichotomous opposition, and most institutional analysis sees the "free" market as the default alternative. But the opposite applies to public responsibility, which is associated with public institutions – the state, government and public agencies - rather than non-state or private bodies. Repositioning public responsibility, then, must mean devolution of authority and power to act from traditional governments and public agencies, and sharing "public" responsibility with civil society and private organizations and institutions: associations, households, families and firms.

This is one of the "bread-and-butter" concerns in many of the issues and cases that involve ID in developing policies and plans, and designing, delivering and implementing programs and projects. At the highest "level", ID is engaged in shaping and reshaping institutions of countries in transitions. One such transition is from conventional-modern government to postmodern governance and "reshaping" representative to participative democracy (Dryzek, 1996). Another is the transformation of political-economic institutions in Eastern Europe from state controlled socio-economies to advanced social democracies (Offe, 1996).

In broad-scale social policy planning and related program design, ID is often invoked to meet this challenge. The ID and evolution of the UK welfare state, and the NHS in particular (Klein, 1996), is a prominent case in point. On the issue of national health services and related insurance and delivery programs comparison and evaluation of IDs between the UK, Canada, Scandinavia and the US is revealing<sup>5</sup>. The ID of social policies and programs focuses on the allocation of responsibilities in ways that reconcile effectiveness with accountability. This means looking at alternative assignments of planning, management and monitoring responsibilities, funding or financing sources, and in-field delivery functions between the various public agencies, NGOs, and private actors that make up the relevant policy-issue system, to assess and evaluate their implications.

Policies, programs and projects in planning-related areas - housing, urban revitalization and community development, settlement planning and regional development, and environmental planning and management – offer instructive cases that show how ID repositions public responsibility. One example is the varying and changing (over time) ID of public, social and affordable housing policies and programs between countries and socio-political cultures, e.g. the UK (with its "council housing"), the Netherlands and Scandinavia (with their active housing associations), Israel (declining state-led) and the US (federally funded decentralized and privatized) and their relative effectiveness<sup>6</sup>. Other examples are different IDs for regional development, new towns and planned communities, urban renewal and revitalization programs<sup>7</sup>, and river basin management in Europe and the USA (Alexander, 1995).

In project planning and design, conventional approaches to "sharing public responsibility" reduce the question to the common dispute for or against privatization. A more sophisticated approach disaggregates the project planning and delivery process, to explore the consequences of private vs.

public provision of its relevant constituent elements, including their respective transaction costs. One main issue is *procurement*: public, private or a combination – public-private partnerships (PPPs) in various forms. These can involve alternative procurement structures and processes from design-build to design-build- finance-operate-maintain. Another is *financing*: public vs. private; here again PPPs are possible. Public or private financing raises the question of value capture – another way of repositioning public responsibility for funding – and alternative IDs for value capture , e.g. special assessments, special Districts, or PPPs based on land sequestration (Alexander, 2015.b).

## 5. Public Values in ID: Cases<sup>8</sup>

### 5.1 The EU and its Institutions

The painful emergence of agreed-upon institutional responses to the possible collapse of the Euro and the depression of EU economies illustrates how the dynamics of competing proposals reflect their proponents' public values – linked to their particular values and interests. Thus rival configurations and rules for the ECB's (European Central Bank) credit and support for EU banks and financial instruments, and emerging EU institutions to ensure member nations' fiscal responsibility<sup>9</sup>, respond to member states' conflicting respective demands.

On the one hand austerity – reflecting the public values of economic discipline, independence and responsibility (effectuated through fiscal control from Brussels) is Germany's demand, endorsed by some of the northern EU members. On the other hand "growth" (supported by ECB credit and funding, and ultimately by mutualizing part of member states' debts) – reflecting the public values of solidarity and mutual support – is advocated by France, Italy and Spain, supported by the EU southern and eastern periphery.

Over the longer run, the design and evolution of EU institutions and their roles in developing and implementing EU policies illustrate the interplay between national interests and particular values and supranational European "community" interests in two alternative models. The intergovernmental model assigns primacy to national institutions and interests and prioritizes the public values of state sovereignty and independence. Here EU institutions are limited to a mediating role between national interests and values.

The "communitarian" model emphasizes the supranational aspect of EU institutions and prioritizes the values of community and solidarity linked with the value of economic efficiency, which was the incentive for the original European Common Market. EU institutions promote this model, seeing progress as ever increasing integration and evolution toward a federal state. These models explain European integration as a form of "dialectic structuralism" alternating "communitarian" periods of accelerated integration with slower intergovernmental intervals.

### 5.2 Metropolitan-Regional Planning in New York and Queensland<sup>10</sup>

Comparing the institutions that were set up for planning the metropolitan regions of New York (USA) and Queensland (Australia) offers some enlightening lessons in ID. The subjects of this comparison are the Committee on the Regional Plan of New York's development of the 1929 *Regional Plan of New York and its Environs*, and the institution and operation of a complex intergovernmental structure for the SEQ 2001 Project: preparing and implementing a plan for the metropolitan region of South East Queensland.

New York: In the first case, the personal initiative of a prominent banker led to the establishment of the Committee on the Regional Plan of New York to develop a plan for the metropolitan region. The Committee was an extra-governmental body representing primarily business and financial interests. It was supported by a professional (planner) head with a small (foundation funded) staff who applied the rational planning model to develop its plan. The Committee's isolation from its relevant social and institutional environment is the most striking thing about it. All its interactions with outside bodies were informal, limited to consultation and information exchange between officials and staffs. Consequently, rather than the Committee's emergent proposals influencing other planning in progress, outside plans and projects modified its metro-regional plan. The resulting plan was more a collage of existing proposals than an integrated vision of its own. In retrospect, the failure of the plan to realize its sponsors' aims can be attributed to the flaws in the institutional design of the planning process and its agents.

Queensland: The SEQ2001 project shows a successful application of ID, in a planning process that resolved the multiple actors' concerns about the distribution of power through a "cooperative partnership". The founding conference included 20 local governments, the existing regional organization, State and Commonwealth government agencies, and community and business groups.

The ID was a complex (but effective) planning process structured through several interlocking organizations. Its overall governance and policy direction was by an interorganizational group established by State government, the Regional Planning Advisory Group (RPAG), representing all the primary stakeholders, backed up by a more broadly-based Advisory Council. The RPAG was really a new planning organization with its own professional staff seconded from participating agencies. Overlapping the RPAG was the S.E. Queensland Organization of Councils (SEQROC) – a formal association of all the region's local governments – and its sub-regional affiliates. These provided the local government input to the regional planning process, the "bottom-up" component complementing the RPAG's "top-down" integration of the planning process.

Plan development was an interactive process over several years, ultimately producing the final plan SEQ2001 that was formally adopted by all the relevant governments through a binding Memorandum of Agreement. The evidence of the success of this ID is the outcome: an adopted regional plan with the same powers as a statutory plan, but its implementation is by agreement and contract, instead of law.

- Comparison and discussion: These two institutional designs of metropolitan-regional planning processes were driven by very different public values, which resembled each other only in their common procedural, rather than substantive, orientation. The New York case reflected its principal actors' values of scientific-technocratic rationality, while the values driving the Queensland case were very different, reflecting different actors in a different time.

The SEQ2001 project effectuated the espoused value of democratic participation in the institutional design of the planning process and its organizational structure. At the same time the ID served another public value that was equally important - effectiveness in goal-achievement - since no plan could be implemented that was not the product of all the stakeholders' participation in the planning process.

### *5.3 Military base closing in the U.S. Congress*

For decades, closing major military bases in the USA was a problem, due to Congress' control over administration proposed budgets and expenditures. As a result, any proposed base closures were

deleted in the congressional oversight committees, whose senior members had a vested interest in keeping these bases in their constituencies. To solve this problem Congress had to find a face-saving way to allow the members of the powerful Armed Services Committees to make the base closure decisions to which they were entitled, while forcing them to decide to close some bases. A congressional commission developed a new three-stage decision-making process that was adopted by the appropriations committees.

In the first stage the Dept. of Defense presented a list of all the bases it wanted to close. In the second stage the committee set its agenda: a list of bases that were its own candidates for closing, by rigorously applying a set of criteria developed by the commission that included physical and operational considerations, "need" factors and cost saving potential. The final stage was voting, when committee members ranked all the bases on their list by priority for closing. Depending on the savings generated by each closure, this procedure always yielded a collective committee decision on how many and which bases to close to meet the framework budget.

This case illustrates how ID effectuates public values: here the congressional commission successfully reconciled two public values that often conflict. One is democracy, manifested in due process of the U.S. Congress and federal government. The other is effectiveness: deciding on feasible actions to achieve defined goals. The goal in this case is also a public value - fiscal discipline - and the new military base closure process was a reformed institutional framework to effectuate this public value.

## **6. Repositioning public responsibility: Cases**

### *6.1 New towns and planned communities<sup>11</sup>*

There have been striking changes over time in positioning public responsibility for planning and constructing new towns and planned communities. Up to the mid-1960's this was essentially undertaken by central government; later ID of public-sponsored new-settlement programs had increasing devolution to and participation by local governments, civil society (voluntary associations) and the private sector (developers and land development corporations)<sup>12</sup>. This is shown in the US Greenbelt and New Communities Development programs and the UK New Towns program.

The centralized model – conventional government-public planning and delivery, with varying IDs – applies to the earlier programs. The US Greenbelt program of the 1930s (part of Roosevelt's "New Deal" addressing the problems of the great Depression) was run by a new agency which was a subunit of the federal Resettlement Administration. The federal government was the public developer, doing the planning, land acquisition and development, construction and management of the three new towns it built, and funding the whole program. The government remained the landowner-administrator until the properties were sold to the residents<sup>13</sup> in the mid-1940s. The only exception to this centralization was in planning, which was done in coordination with existing State and municipal planning powers.

The UK New Towns program (which began in the late 1940s and continued into the 1970s) also followed this model, though with some important modifications over time. The government created a new agency as the public developer, a New Town Corporation, for each new town, immediately upon deciding on its general configuration and location. These Corporations were like private development corporations with two exceptions. Their funding was advanced by the Treasury, and they enjoyed planning powers that were preempted from their areas' local authorities. The early generations of New Towns were planned, developed, constructed and administered directly by their Corporations, which exercised close control over their development through most of the stages of their growth. Later



generations saw gradual relaxation of control with outsourcing of subarea planning and detailed planning and design to private developers who acquired large tracts of land<sup>14</sup>. These also saw much more public participation in planning their growth and much quicker devolution of political-administrative authority to the communities' newly constituted local authorities.

### *6.2 Groundwater conservation in Apulia*

At a contrasting scale to the last cases, all national programs, this is an example of proposed ID to reposition public responsibility at the most local level, from a quasi-governmental district agency to specific areas' farmers. This exercise grew out of a critical review of Bruschetta and Giordano's (2015) analysis of problems in implementing groundwater protection policy in Apulia. Their description of the policy-action arena identified three relevant actors: the regional authority (regulator), the irrigation management consortium (water allocator-distributor) and the region's farmers (users)<sup>15</sup>. The problem was the failure to implement groundwater conservation policy through the consortium's price-setting, when farmers did not reduce their water consumption in response to higher water cost, but converted to more profitable (but more water-intensive) crops.

This is a classic ID problem: the irrigation management consortium should be a common resource pool association (Ostrom, 1990). Institutional analysis would show its present shortcomings, which are the source of the current problems. The most likely cause of the consortium's policy failure is flaws in its structure and governance, in particular its disconnection from the farmers who are the relevant users of the common resource. A secondary factor is the consortium's present simple water pricing and policy goal ("guarantee equal water distribution") which is inadequate to address the farmer-users' predictable strategic behavior.

A new ID would change the structure and governance of the irrigation management consortium to turn it into a common resource pool association. Following Ostrom's principles<sup>16</sup>, these changes would restructure the organization to integrate the (now separate) farmers and "consortium" through a newly designed framework for collective governance and decision making. The new consortium could ration the available groundwater proportionally to use-benefit, by developing an irrigation water allocation model that would be run each year or season to arrive at a price schedule for irrigation water that is agreed-upon by the suppliers and the farmer-users. This model could be applied to vary between subareas, so that it would be administered collectively by the farmers in that subarea, which would ensure effective policy implementation.

## **7. Discussion**

Above we see how practicing planning as ID can address two important aspects of "repositioning public responsibility". One relates to public values; the other involves structural devolution of public responsibility.

First, "repositioning" implies changing priorities between values, which leads to the links between planning, ID and public values. Public values concern planning because planning is charged with representing and promoting the public interest. Dialogic concepts of the Public Interest involve agreement on a case-specific public interest; this occurs whenever public agencies deliberate on adopting policies, programs or projects, or review projects submitted for permission or approval, and courts review disputed proposals. These are important channels and arenas for effectuating public values, and our cases show how ID of relevant processes and institutions can reposition public responsibility.

Next, "repositioning" can mean moving the locus of traditionally "public" responsibility; this is a classic challenge for ID at every level and in many fields. At the macro-level it can involve evolutionary "constitution writing" for socio-economic regimes (as in our cases of EU institutions and democratizing East European countries), but this concerns us less. The "meso"-level of ID is of more interest for planning, involving policy-making and planning with plan, program and project design and implementation. Relevant fields range from broad social policy and human services through strategic infrastructure planning and delivery, to multi-scale planning: from metro-regional to neighborhood-level community development.

ID alternatives to conventional public planning and regulation and program-project design and delivery include the common resource pool association (as in the Apulia groundwater case), inter-organizational collaborative planning (as in the SEQ2100 case), and PPPs in various configurations for infrastructure, settlement planning and land development, urban revitalization and community development – shown in other cases above.

Planning can reposition public responsibility through ID. Institutions can be designed to effectuate appropriate public values, such as democracy, transparency, and accountability. Through alternative ID planning can restructure institutions to devolve public responsibility from state agencies and share it with private actors and civil society.

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## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> All planning is not ID; many planning practices and activities do not involve ID at all.
- <sup>2</sup> Much of this section is from Alexander (2015.a).
- <sup>3</sup> For example, to void otherwise valid contracts in private law, and in U.S. anti-trust actions.
- <sup>4</sup> These exist (usually) as institutional rights in various fields, e.g. health care, welfare, education etc. In planning they are called "planning rights" – for more detail see Alexander (2002.b)
- <sup>5</sup> The literature on this is too extensive to cite here.
- <sup>6</sup> This is a whole field of research and study in itself.
- <sup>7</sup> See cases below.
- <sup>8</sup> Condensed from Alexander (2015.a).
- <sup>9</sup> Limitations of time and space prohibit going into any detail here.
- <sup>10</sup> This case is based on Abbott (2009) and Alexander (2009).
- <sup>11</sup> For sources, see Alexander (1995).
- <sup>12</sup> Scandinavia is an exception: Sweden's new towns planning and development (1950s-70s) heavily involved local government (especially Stockholm municipality) while Finland's also engaged Helsinki city government and national housing associations.
- <sup>13</sup> Previously their tenancy was by leasehold.
- <sup>14</sup> This trend reached its climax in Milton Keynes, where the Corporation's planning and development responsibility was limited to the town's major infrastructure grid that framed its neighborhoods.
- <sup>15</sup> Applying ambiguity analysis to this problem, the authors gave no information on these actors' institutional characteristics, and whether/how farmers are represented in the irrigation management consortium and participate in its governance.
- <sup>16</sup> Using Ostrom's (2005) IAD (Institutional Analysis and Development) method.