

## **Environmental Policy-Making in the Chinese Urban Growth Regime**

YAN WANG<sup>1</sup>

Keywords: environment, local, China

---

This paper examines the politics of local environmental policy-making within the wider context of urban governance in contemporary China. Theoretically, the research approach links with the strategic-relational approach to policy-making, which emphasizes the importance of grounding empirical research on a detailed analysis of the various contexts for local action including an understanding of how different actors and organizations interpret their strategically-selective contexts. The analytical framework is based on the conception that the strategic selectivity of local environmental policy-making invariably reflects a set of structural opportunities for or constraints on policy-making, as well as the perception that key actors have of those opportunities or constraints and both of these. The paper thus focus on understanding how local urban authorities and politicians have responded to international, national or regional political pressures, as well as local pressures for or against local urban environmental policy-making. The paper also explores the incentives for and constraints on proactive environmental policy at the urban scale.

---

### **Introduction**

In the past three decades, the Chinese economy has experienced an unprecedented progress, showing average national economic growth percentages of around 8 per cent (Mol and Cater, 2007), as a result of the introduction of a market economy. China's economic expansion has significant implications for environmental management. In particular, the scale and severity of environmental problems in China is increasingly seen as a threat to the economic and social foundations of its modernization (Morton, 2005). Coinciding with a growing awareness of these environmental challenges, China is thus facing the dual task of developing its economy and protecting its environment. The result has so far been a somewhat weak approach to environmental policy with the overriding emphasis being on maintaining rapid economic growth as the first order priority. However, the situation is changing as ideas of sustainable development and ecological modernization become part of decision-making at both national and urban levels. The paper is especially concerned with changing approaches to urban environmental policy-making in China.

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, UK.

**Theoretical perspective of environmental policy-making**

Environmental policy is usually about the role of governments (the state) in seeking to regulate use of, or protect, natural resources to ensure sustainable development or mitigate the environmental externalities of economic and social activities, e.g. waste reduction, pollution control (Haughton and Hunter, 1994; Gibbs, 2002; Robert, 2004; Brand and Thomas, 2005; Cohen, 2006). It might also be about restoration or enhancement of environmental assets or about incentives for less unsustainable actions (Gibbs et al., 2002; While et al., 2004; Jonas et al., 2004; Jonas and While, 2007). It can happen through various means, such as regulation, taxation, education and steering, directives, and so on (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000). There is a range of possible concerns of environmental policy in terms of sectoral and policy focus – e.g. water and waste management, carbon reduction, reducing air pollution, ecological preservation and enhancement. Whether and how these issues are addressed will depend on the nature of the problems and incentives in a particular territory, and the degree of importance given to different problems and policy options (Gibbs, et al., 2002; While et al, 2004; Jonas et al., 2004; Jonas and While, 2007). These are often choices about economic and social value, including issues of fairness as reflecting in environmental justice debates (Haughton, 1999a; 1999b). At various points, environmental policy might overlap with, or conflict with economic and social goals (While, et al., 2004; While, et al., 2009).

A key principle for the paper is that although there are a multitude of possible areas of environmental and ecological intervention (and means of intervention), environmental policy invariably reflects a highly selective process (Jessop, 1997; Jonas, et al., 2004; While et al., 2004). This reflects a range of factors, such as wider cultural attitudes and strategic selectivity within a state territory, economic factors, and public pressures for and against aspects of environmental policy within and across a given territory (While et al., 2004; While et al., 2009). Environmental policy also emerges through a process of struggle and negotiation, especially as environmental policy might be seen as a collective approach that intrudes on the perceived rights of the individual (While et al., 2004; Jonas and While, 2007). The economic factor is particularly important given arguments that environmental policy has become dominated by ‘master concepts’ (Keil, 2007) that serve to internalize environmental and ecological concerns within neoliberal accumulation strategies. From this perspective, environmental and economic goals are traded off against each other in environmental policy-making. Above all, While et al. (2004) conceptualize local environmental policy-making as a result of selective incorporation of various pressures in terms of the search for a ‘local sustainability fix’, the outcome of which reflects pressures and demands for and against environment policy in a specific national-urban context (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000; Gibbs et al., 2002; Jonas et al., 2004). However this theoretical perspective for environmental policy-making is based on Western experiences, and thus gives rise to questions about whether such a framework is relevant to China. For example, the different state system, the power of the Party, different cultural attitudes to the environment, and factors such as limited public participation in China might suggest the need for different approaches, but in some respects the key

---

elements of urban environmental policy are not too dissimilar in terms of pressures to prioritise economic development and limited incentives for strong sustainability.

### **The context of Chinese cities in the reform era**

Chinese official documents have declared that Chinese economic reform since 1978 is aimed at the transformation from a centrally planned economy to a ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’. Such a notion of the Chinese socialist market economy has been explained by scholars as the adoption of a quasi-capitalist system through the mechanisms of capital operations (see Xia, 2000) and the incorporation of neoliberal elements combined with state authoritarianism (see Harvey, 2005). Under these conditions, the local state in China is undergoing a shift towards what might be described as an entrepreneurial mode of governance (Duckett, 1998; Wu et al., 2007). In the reform era, as argued by some scholars, the different forces by marketization, decentralization, and recentralization have together determined the context for urban governance in China (see Duckett, 1998; Cannon, 2000; Wu and Ma, 2005; Wu et al, 2007). Chinese cities are positioned at the centre of the national economic growth regime facing pressures to achieve economic development in a context of intense inter-urban competition. As such, the challenges of reconciling tensions between socio-economic growth and environmental protection in localities have been largely left to local authorities. For example, city leaders are required to meet environmental regulations set by the Chinese governments. In addition, environmental protection is also becoming important for cities that want to attract or retain higher-value firms, middle-class residents or tourists. Although local officials are largely restricted to working with the national weak sustainability model, there is scope for autonomous action and variations in local response. In this context, the paper examines what determines the environmental policy processes of a particular urban authority (Nanchang City), acting within the broader national-urban context.

### **The methodological approach**

In methodological terms, the central aim of the paper is to understand the decisions taken about what to prioritise in environmental policy-making at the local scale. The strategic-relational approach (Hay and Jessop, 1995; Jessop, 1997; Jessop, 2001) is employed as the key theoretical concerns underpinning the approach taken to empirical research. A strategic-relational account of policy agenda emphasizes the importance of grounding empirical research on a detailed analysis of various contexts for local action, including an understanding of how different actors interpret their ‘strategically-selective context’. The strategic-relational approach thus provides a viable framework for developing a genuinely actor-sensitive research agenda. Overall, the strategic-relational approach has several features that render it especially important to local environmental policy-making in China, notably:

- Its direct relevance to a state system which combines strong central control with a varying degree of autonomy for local decision-elites;
- The importance of understanding the motivations of key policy-makers (and this might be particularly important in China), including their selective interpretation of the context for action;
- The importance of understanding different pressures and demands in terms of the strategically selective context for environmental policy making in China.

Based on the actor-sensitive research agenda, the empirical research is grounded on interview-based qualitative techniques. In emphasizing that each locality is unique in terms of specific context and local responses, the Nanchang case-study allows for exploration of the changing structural context for decisions about the environment and ecology in ‘ordinary’ Chinese cities (Robinson, 2006). The research draws on an extensive review of background literature and policy documents gathered before, during and after the interviews. Interviews were also supplemented by non-participant observation in bureaucratic activities and meetings for understanding perceptions and decision-making processes with regard to the local key policy areas. Using these multiple sources also allowed the researcher to corroborate representations. Analysis of the material was concerned with what took place, what was conducted, and some of the main themes and stories.

### **Empirical research findings**

Through empirical research, the key findings can be summarized in the following four aspects. In accordance with these research findings, the contribution of the paper is the development of a wide conceptual framework for understanding environmental politics and policy within urban growth dynamics in post-reform China.

#### ***Local responses to the strategic selectivity of national policies***

In Nanchang city, the objects, priorities, and strategic selectivity of local urban environmental policy reflect the overall economic orientation of local urban strategy. Whilst environmental interventions in Nanchang have reflected issues of ecological security – e.g. local policies for drinking water quality – and the need to respond to higher-level pro-environmental mandates in areas such as emissions reduction targets for SO<sub>2</sub> and COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand), the central theme of local environmental policies in Nanchang is the use of greening strategies to stimulate investment through various programs of land-based regeneration and industrial structural adjustment. Given the increasing pressure on attracting inward investment from mobile capital, Chinese cities have taken on an entrepreneurial stance to their respective economic development. This has resulted in severe economic competition between cities and within the city (Ma, 2005; Wu and Ma, 2005; Wu et al., 2007). The program of fiscal decentralization has also given local governments strong incentives to establish local enterprises and to invest in new economic growth (Qiao and Shah, 2006; Zhu and Krug, 2007). During the reform era, it is argued that central-local relations in China have evolved into

‘decentralized developmental state’ (Oi, 1995) with localities engaged in ‘bounded localized development’ (Cannon, 2000). In this context, local authorities in China have had to act as entrepreneurial agents in making coalitions with the private sector and attracting inward investment in order to realize their accumulation strategies (Wu et al., 2007). The point here is that Nanchang has followed the tendency towards Chinese urban entrepreneurialism.

Despite growing rhetorical support for environmental protection, the strategic selectivity of national regulations in China offers relatively little support or incentive for proactive environmental policy compared with pro-growth economic policy. Although the Chinese ‘environmental state’ (Mol and Carter, 2007) is increasingly involved in securing environmental protection through mandates, regulations and incentives, the mechanisms for environmental governance in China is yet characterized by bureaucratic fragmentation, competing environmental policy bureaucracies, and weak enforcement (Zusman and Turner, 2005). Moreover, the dominant target of national policy in terms of sustainable development is based on intensity of pollutants and their impacts on environmental quality. In a presentation in 2009, the Environmental Protection Minister, Zhou Shengxian especially notes that the intensity of pollutant emission is critical and thus the current policy of energy-saving and emission reduction should be devoted to intensity reduction of SO<sub>2</sub> and COD, but not a specific target setting for CO<sub>2</sub> because its intensity in China has not had significant impacts on environmental quality at both local and national scale (Zhou, 2009). The intensity-based targets are argued to be indexed to the economic growth of the country, but do not necessarily require a decrease in economic production or an absolute decrease in emissions (Lewis, 2007).

Chinese local authorities have also been able to choose to ignore issues of renewable energy and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in their localities. However, under the incentives of state support in terms of funding projects and the global energy industrial market, in recent years local authorities have conducted a series of substantial actions towards local industrial structural adjustment which has an environmental component. Overall, the general goal of national policies aims to promote a relatively weak variant of sustainable development by prioritizing economic growth. Thereby, cities such as Nanchang are usually locked into a pro-growth policy and major loans have been taken out by local urban authorities to fund easily visualized development and infrastructure, such as new residential areas, industrial parks and motorways, rather than those intangible aspects like social welfare and ecological preservation. As a result, Chinese cities have become growth machines for the national economy. At the same time, they are significant users of local and global resources, including global public goods (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2008). This regime is characterized by urban-based agglomerative economies through prioritizing urban scale for intensive accumulation, commodifying urban space, and adopting global-oriented production (see Wu et al., 2007).

### ***Central-local relations and the issue of local autonomy***

---

There is evidence that urban political leaders in Nanchang would like to do more on local environment policy, as witnessed by some proactive activities and evidence of a change in approach over time, with environmental policy becoming more of a priority. The problem for pro-environmental interests at the local level is the lack of scope to go beyond intervention with a fairly narrow economic orientation. Local political leaders are confronted with financial pressures on local governments, mainly as a result of unfunded mandates of the Central Government, which has retained control over the policy agenda in spite of fiscal decentralization, but requires local governments to cover expenditures on unemployment insurance, social security, and welfare (see Saich, 2008). With such tremendous pressure on local political leaders, economic development tends to become the overriding priority and they have seen themselves as both administrators and entrepreneurs (Oi, 1995). Thus, there are pervasive incentives for local leaders to produce rapid economic growth. Moreover, environmental offices generally are under the authority of officials whose priority is short-term growth rather than long-term sustainability.

The evidence of local environmental policy initiatives and interventions described in this thesis suggests that Nanchang's municipal authority has prioritised projects which represent a 'win-win' prospect for the articulation of urban economic growth and environmental protection. For instance, urban lakes rehabilitation has helped support the prosperity of local urban property market alongside the waterfront area, while local natural wetland restoration has promoted the special ecological value for local tourism. In these examples, local environmental improvements have affected the consumption habits and lifestyles of local residents, profiting them by boosting home property values and lowering the costs of household services. The local power plant was shut down eventually so that the city could escape from the high-sulphur pollution and upgrade the local profile of energy supply structure. In addition, the municipal authority has also actively participated in various city examinations by the Central Government and its subordinate agencies in terms of environment protection, sanitation condition, and green open space according to national standards, with the aims of improving city image, attracting and retaining high-skill labour and high-quality personnel to settle in the city. It is noteworthy that the national examinations have specific economic indicators related to combining growth with environmental protection, such as the environmental model city programme reflecting the vision of ecological modernization. To some extent, it could be argued that local economic growth in the future Chinese city will need to be linked to local environmental improvements.

It is obvious that local leaders have recognized the importance of environmental policy and the impact of local environmental quality on their career development under the established national environmental responsibility system. The slogan of 'reproducing the city for local people' that the current municipal Party secretary put forward has promoted policies of the Nanchang Municipal Government to implement more concrete environmental actions, such as urban drainage reconstruction especially in the low-lying areas. Such policies can be viewed as social welfare programs to improve the living conditions of local disadvantaged social groups. Nevertheless, the challenge for the Municipal Government is how to sustain the efforts of

---

these policies under constrained resources and competing demands. The main story of Nanchang would be that the strategic selectivity of urban development in China does not facilitate such an approach. Equally important, local policy-makers with their absolute powers in pursuit of stronger local environmental policy are still appointed by their superior authorities. Thus, they must listen to the leaders at the level directly above to secure their positions, and their tenures are usually shorter than the mandated term of office for the positions. The process of appointment for these officials is non-transparent and through the tightly knit Party-based system (Ma, 2002).

At the local scale, the market-based instruments and the methods of clean production cannot effectively offset the impact of cost competition amongst the cities. Moreover, local pressure groups have not yet obtained their substantially influential power in the local decision-making process. This poses a series of challenges to the city in pursuit of more substantial green growth. Therefore, the Central Government could play a stronger role than it does currently in building the capacity of local government to implement national environmental policies. China's system is in the midst of constant change. While et al. (2004, p.554) remark that "the relation between urban entrepreneurialism and the search for an urban sustainability fix is becoming a necessary rather than contingent condition of the contemporary political and economic form of urbanization in capitalism", which has been "something of a recoupling of urban political reforms and environmental interventions" (Jonas and While, 2007, p.151). In recent years, some significant policies from the Central Government in China are likely to increase the imperatives and incentives for local environmental action, and these include the general tightening up of implementation by calling for a service-oriented government with improved systems of public notice, and public hearings to expand participation of the general public in management of public affairs, and increasing transparency of government work with more open government affairs, e-government (Chen, 2006; Horsley, 2006). The current Chinese leadership is trying to address the inequities of reform under the slogan of 'building a harmonious society' having a significant goal for adjusting incentives for local officials. Overall, the longer term prognosis is less gloomy in terms of incentives for environmental policy.

### ***The specificity of Nanchang in the Chinese context***

One important aspect of the Nanchang case study is that although it is a fairly typical – or 'ordinary' - large Chinese city, there are certain elements that create opportunities for proactive environmental policy which might not exist in other cities, notably:

- The status of the city as a regional capital – the municipal authority has attained full autonomy in local policy-making from both the central and provincial authorities, and the city was selected as one of key cities for the examination of urban environmental protection by the Central Government. The regional status of Nanchang not only gives it symbolic importance, but also opens up opportunities for a higher-value approach to future urban economic development.

- The natural environment of the city and its material and symbolic importance – Nanchang is renowned for its rich ecological resources. The quality of the existing natural environment does not just create demands and aspirations for local ecological and environmental management and protection, but again it opens up opportunities for economy-environment overlaps that provide incentives for proactive environmental policy.
- The potential and aspiration to restructure around what might be called a ‘high-road’ vision of economic development – the municipal authority has showed great interests in eco-development and conducted some experiments whilst building partnership with businesses for the management of local urban infrastructure.

As a result, the prospects for places like Nanchang look fairly positive in terms of environmental policy, but for other cities the picture might not be so good. There is evidence that many heavy-polluting enterprises are simply moving from the coastal to the central and western cities (Cann et al., 2005; Economy, 2007). Some local governments have undertaken blind pursuit of quick and short-term economic gain without regard to environmental consequences and thus encouraged both domestic and foreign investment into large-scale polluting and resource-intensive industries in China (see Economy, 2007). Meanwhile, local officials were still eager to under-price land to win over foreign and domestic investors to their jurisdictions (Wu et al., 2007). Compared with those cities, the Nanchang Municipal Government has set up a series of environmental restrictions in local examination and approval system for any new industrial projects, such as the special status issued for local industrial parks, although the city in the ranking list of investment attraction once dropped to the bottom among all of cities within the same province in 2007.

According to city categories in China, different cities have different degrees of local autonomy in terms of fiscal regime, administrative rank, and local policy-making. Owing to China’s top-down urban development, the Central Government still plays a very important role in the ambitious development projects, including the building of global cities, for instance, the development of Shanghai as a global city is part of an overall strategy of the Central Government in order to revitalize the Yangtze River region by providing both institutional and financial supports in terms of changing the tax regime to the city (Wu, 2003). Compared with those ‘extra-ordinary’ cities, Nanchang is more in line with the general urban growth regime in China.

### ***Economy-environment relations at the urban scale***

The crucial area in this research is how individual local authorities seek to balance economy-environment relations in the Chinese national-urban context based on the analytical framework in identifying the pressures for or against local environmental policy-making. Based on the above discussions, three outstanding findings have thus been drawn with regard to evolving economy-environment relations at the urban scale:



First, the situation is changing but the strategic selectivity of national economic and urban policy still does not offer much incentive for radical changes in environmental governance even in cities like Nanchang where there is a willingness to improve environmental protection. This is because cities are largely locked into the entrepreneurial growth paradigm.

Second, the areas where national policy is strategically strong depend upon the selective recentralization in these fields, which can be especially witnessed by the recent change in land administration. There are a number of honours and rewards which are established by the central government for local environmental quality examinations, but there is little support for cities in terms of clean energy supply and carbon emission reduction.

Third, although environmental policy and economic growth should be beneficial to all local residents, the advantages and disadvantages of local growth and environmental externalities in reality have been unevenly distributed. The strategic selectivity of environmental policy in Nanchang is also shaped by the lack of democratic pressure from the poorer residents. This is reflected in the fact that environmental policy is not only aligned with economic development, but it is also weak in terms of addressing environmental injustice. Within the local state, there are still constraints on public participation and information access for environmental concerns. Also, local policy-makers tend to be appointed by their superior authorities, but not elected by the local voters within their prefectures. Thus, local decision-makers usually pay less attention on the real demands of local public, but tend to service for special local social groups according to their income and power status. Chinese society is far from being pluralist (Xu and Yeh, 2005). Policy-making power still remains in the hands of the political elites, albeit with growing pressure from the middle classes.

## **Conclusions**

The paper has seen an era in China when environmental issues have begun to be taken more seriously. However, it might be the case that there is increased unevenness between the environmental conditions of cities, and this is something I have identified in the paper as rapid growth becomes increasingly differentiated into high road and low road possibilities. Low road in this sense implies driving down the costs of business. What we are seeing in Nanchang is the attempt to use environmental policy to follow a high road path, and this is likely to give way in the future to greater autonomy for cities to construct more demanding sustainability fixes. A key question thus emerges about prospects for the future, e.g. in terms of whether carbon control and ecological security will alter the strategic and structural context for action, the implications of a shift in the development paradigm to a quality of growth perspective due to pressures from firms, government and citizens. In addition, there are likely to be different constraints and opportunities in different places. In this respect, the prospects for places like Nanchang look fairly positive, but for other cities (and their residents) the picture might not be so good. Overall, what this paper has demonstrated is that urban environmental policy will become an increasingly important concern for Chinese cities.

## References

Brand, P. and Thomas, M. J. (2005) *Urban Environmentalism – Global change and the mediation of local conflict*. London, Routledge.

Cann, C. W., Cann, M. C. and Gao, S. Q. (2005) China's Road to Sustainable Development: An Overview. In: K. A. Day (eds.), *China's Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development*. London, M.E.Sharpe. pp. 3-34.

Cannon, T. (2000) Introduction – The Economic Reforms, Demographic Processes and Environmental Problems. In: T. Cannon (eds.), *China's Economic Growth – the Impact on Regions, Migration and the Environment*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. pp. 1-32.

Chen, W. X. (2006) The Essence of Promoting “Political Civilization” in China: Institution Building. In Y. Zhong and S.P. Hua (eds.), *Political Civilization and Modernization in China: The Political Context of China's Transformation*. London, World Scientific. pp.11-34.

Cohen, S. (2006) *Understanding Environmental Policy*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Duckett, J. (1998) *The Entrepreneurial State in China*. London and New York, Routledge.

Economy, E. (2007) Environmental Governance: the Emerging Economic Dimension. In: N. T. Carter & A. P. J. Mol (eds.), *Environmental Governance in China*. London, Routledge. pp. 23-41.

Gibbs, D. (2002) *Local Economic Development and the Environment*. London, Routledge.

Gibbs, D. and Jonas, A. E. G. (2000) Governance and Regulation in Local Environmental Policy: the Utility of a Regime Approach. *Geoforum*, 31, 299-313.

Gibbs, D., Jonas, A. E. G. and While, A. (2002) Changing Governance Structures and the Environment: Economy-Environment Relations at the Local and Regional Scales. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 4, 123-138.

Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Haughton, G. (1999a) Environmental justice and the sustainable city. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 18, 233-243.

Haughton, G. (1999b) Key policy domains for improving the urban environment. *Environment and Urbanization*, 11(2), 51-62.

Haughton, G. and Hunter, C. (1994) *Sustainable Cities*. London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers/Regional Studies Association.

Hay, C. (1995) Structure and Agency. In D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. London, Macmillan.

Hay, C. and Jessop, B. (1995) *The governance of local economic development and the development of local economic governance: A strategic-relational approach*. Paper presented to the American Political Science Association. Chicago, September 1995.

Horsley, J. P. (2006) Public Participation and the Democratization of Chinese Governance. In Y. Zhong and S. P. Hua (eds.), *Political Civilization and Modernization in China: The Political Context of China's Transformation*. London, World Scientific. pp. 207-250.

Jessop, B. (1997) A neo-Gramscian approach to the regulation of urban regimes: accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects and governance. In M. Lauria (eds.), *Reconstructing urban regime theory: regulating urban politics in a global economy*. Thousand Oaks CA, Sage. pp.51-73

Jessop, B. (2001) Institutional re(turns) and the strategic-relational approach. *Environment and Planning A*, 33, 1213-1235.

Jonas, A. E. G. and While, A. (2007) Greening the entrepreneurial city? Looking for spaces of sustainability politics in the competitive city. In R. Krueger and D. Gibbs (eds.), *The sustainable development paradox*. London, Guilford. pp.123-153.

Jonas, A. E. G., While, A. and Gibbs, D. (2004) State modernization and local strategic selectivity after Local Agenda 21: evidence from three northern English localities. *Policy & Politics*, 32(2), 151-168.

Lewis, J. I. (2007) China's Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations. *The Washington Quarterly*, 31(1), 155-174.

Ma, L. J. C. (2002) Urban transformation in China, 1949-2000: a review and research agenda. *Environmental and Planning A*, 34(9), 1545-1569.

Ma, L. J. C. (2005) Urban administrative restructuring, changing scale relations and local economic development in China. *Political Geography*, 24(4), 477-497.

Mol, A. P. J. and Carter, N. T. (2007) China's Environmental Governance in Transition. In: N. T. Carter & A. P. J. Mol (eds.), *Environmental Governance in China*. London, Routledge. pp. 1-22.

Morton, K. (2005) *International Aid and China's Environment – Taming the Yellow Dragon*. London, Routledge.

Oi, J. C. (1995) The role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy. *China Quarterly*, 144(December), 1132-1149.

Qiao, B. Y. and Shah, A. (2006) Local Government Organization and Finance: China. In: A. Shah (eds.), *Local Governance in Developing Countries*. Washington, D.C., The World Bank. pp. 137-168.

Roberts, J. (2004) *Environmental Policy*. London, Routledge.

Robinson, J. (2006) *Ordinary Cities between modernity and development*. London, Routledge.

Saich, T. (2008) The Changing role of Urban Government. In: S. Yusuf and T. Saich (eds.), *China Urbanizes – Consequences, Strategies and Policies* Washington, D.C., The World Bank. pp. 181-206.

While, A., Jonas, A. E. G. and Gibbs, D. (2004) The Environment and the Entrepreneurial City: Searching for the Urban 'Sustainability Fix' in Manchester and Leeds. *Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28(3), 549-569.

While, A., Jonas, A. E. G. and Gibbs, D. (2009) From sustainable development to carbon control: eco-state restructuring and the politics of urban and regional development. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 35(1), 76-93.

Wu, F. L. (2003) The (post-) socialist entrepreneurial city as a state project: Shanghai's reglobalization in question. *Urban Studies*, 40(9), 1673-1698.

Wu, F. L. and Ma, L. J. C. (2005) The Chinese city in transition: towards theorizing China's urban restructuring. In: L. J. C. Ma and F. L. Wu (eds.), *Restructuring the Chinese City: changing society, economy and space*. London, Routledge. pp. 260-279.

Wu, F. L., Xu, J. and Yeh, A. F. O. (2007) *Urban Development in Post-Reform China*. London, Routledge.

Xia, M. (2000) *The Dual Developmental State: development strategy and institutional arrangements for China's transition*. Aldershot, Ashgate.

Xu, J. and Yeh, A. G. O. (2005) City repositioning and competitiveness building in regional development: new development strategies in Guangzhou, China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29(2), 283-308.

Yusuf, S. and Nabeshima, K. (2008) Optimizing Urban Development. In: S. Yusuf and T. Saich (eds.), *China Urbanizes – Consequences, Strategies, and Policies*. Washington, D.C., THE WORLD BANK. pp.1-40.

Zhou, S. X. (2009) Exploring new environmental protection approach under the perspective of ecological civilization. *China's Development Observation*.

Zhu, Z. and Krug, B. (2007) China's Emerging Tax Regime: Local Tax Farming and Central Tax Bureaucracy. In: B. Krug and H. Hendrichske (eds.), *The Chinese Economy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Enterprise and Business Behaviour*. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar. pp. 145-201.

Zusman, E. and Turner, J. L. (2005) Beyond the Bureaucracy: Changing China's Policy-Making Environment. In: K. A. Day (eds.), *China's Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development*. London, M.E.Sharpe. pp.121-150.