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ID 1540 | ON WHAT GROUND STANDS STRATEGIC PLANNING?

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ABSTRACT: We live today in a world where there is enlarged freedom for many of us to invent and reinvent who we are. This freedom, in late capitalist modernity, has also come at a cost. The freedom to invent and reinvent is grounded on an expectation that we can renegotiate the fundamental threads of what we are, and what we are known as. This freedom has spread beyond the individual to our institutions, political parties, and of course public persons. No longer is it possible to say definitively what or who someone is, nor is it possible to hold them to account for who or what they said they are or would be. Such holding to account would be tantamount to a reduction of their liberty. This paper explores what impact this lack of saying, and lack of accountability for what was said has on strategic plans. Starting from Hannah Arendt's discussion of the loss of the public realm, we explore the consequences for strategic planning of this capacity to reinvent ourselves and consider how in this pluralist and individualised world a collectively arrived at vision of the future might be grounded and survive beyond the next saying of ourselves.

KEYWORDS: Heidegger, Arendt, Ontology of planner

1 INTRODUCTION

A strategic plan for a city or metropolitan region is a spatial expression of the public will which endures over time. Albrechts' (2006: 1152) definition serves well: 'Strategic spatial planning is a transformative and integrative, (preferably) public-sector-led, socio-spatial process through which a vision, coherent actions, and means for implementation are produced that shape and frame what a place is and what it might become'. Strategic planning: the making of visions, aligning policies to planned outcomes and the taking of actions in accordance with those visions; is a critical part of the project of planning. It is where the 'will to improve' (Li, 2007) in planning is most clearly situated. But more fundamentally it is the place where

communities can imagine that they have a say over what future they produce, and the opportunity to produce it.

Despite its importance, or perhaps because of it, in many places strategic planning has become deeply politicised, with plans being changed regularly in accordance with the current political climate, the latest technological developments, and the problems of the day. An example would be in the state of Victoria, Australia where since the release of the strategic plan Melbourne 2030 in 2002, there have been two subsequent major revisions (in 2008, and 2014). Under these conditions of constant updating and change there is little possibility for the material realisation of one vision or another. Whatever stable ground strategic plans of the past found (as they appear to have in places like Copenhagen), it seems to have been lost. It would be easy to conclude that nowadays strategic plans are more about keeping the guess about what will happen accurate or up to date, and less about creating some kind of realised future. If that is true then the real purpose of strategic planning has indeed been lost.

This paper however argues that although it is true that strategic planning has in some sense lost its footing, there is a possibility to regain it. Although this loss of footing may have been driven at times by a kind of politics subscribing to neo-liberal ideology (e.g. of Hayek, 1960), it began much earlier and involves an ontological shift of a kind to which Hannah Arendt refers. ((Arendt, 1998). Arendt posits that the public realm has been replaced by a social world. In the social world, it is necessary to 'say oneself' constantly. Unlike the public realm this saying doesn't stick. There is no-one to hold one to account for what was said. Although it remains true that when what is said, and what is done are in constant alignment, we can still become known as someone, the only one we are accountable to for that appears to be ourselves.

Strategic planning is about transformation, and we argue that fundamentally the transformation is one of who a community is being. Transformation in being comes about through authentic dialogue, combined with changes to the materiality of the world, which are achieved in accordance with particular rationalities, that together embed transformed practices or ways of living (Low & Sturup, 2017). This kind of transformation requires not only authentic consultation to develop the strategic plan, but actual implementation of material changes to give the plan effect. It also requires that the material changes embed the rationalities of the strategic plan, in other words the reason for doing it needs to be delivered, not just the object. This takes time. The conversation about why something is being done needs to be maintained, with integrity, throughout the lifecycle of the thing delivered. Without the public realm it is much more difficult to maintain these conversations. We believe it is possible to create sufficient ground for this kind of transformation, but it will take a new kind of advocacy.

The next section of this paper reviews the philosophical discussions within which our thinking about this problem are placed. We begin with a discussion on the relationship between different kinds of being in Heidegger's thought and the concept of fabrication of the world in Arendt's. In this discussion we consider how these ideas inform the notion of strategic planning as transformation, and particularly how what is thus required includes fabrication of both rationalities, and their material expression in order to embed the planned future into structure of our lives. Our discussion then turns to consideration of Arendt's theory about the destruction of the fabricated world and the public realm, and its replacement with the 'social'. The following sections will consider some evidence for both the need for transformation as the basis for successful strategic planning, and evidence for the loss of the public realm. We will conclude the paper with a discussion of what this means for strategic planning.

2 DIFFERENT KINDS OF BEING AND THE FABRICATION OF THE WORLD

What something is and the way something occurs are two sides of the same coin. They happen together, if something ceases to be it cannot occur, if something doesn't occur as that something it is not that something. This is both completely obvious and entirely not obvious. We can understand the first part easily enough, but the second part goes against our idea (and indeed our experience) that we can be something different than how we apparently occur. For example we can be a 35 year old, female, neurologist, acknowledged by our peers as at top of our field, but occur for great aunt Mildred as 'the little girl that likes honey oat cookies'. The resolution to this apparent contradiction can be found in the truth that what we 'are' isn't fixed. Thus whatever we may be in our own occurring, we are also 'the little girl that likes honey oat cookies', and indeed it would not be unusual to find ourselves in the presence of great aunt

Mildred with a craving for, or indeed eating, honey oat cookies. Critically this demonstrates that being is multiple, and that does not in any way reduce the 'reality' of what something is.

Heidegger positions himself as the philosopher of the 'everyday' - one who looks at the everyday experience, from an everyday perspective, which is a phenomenological perspective (see for example Heidegger, 1962: 163-168). In his work we can observe three different types of being (relationships between what something is and how it occurs). He notices that much of what we experience and on which we confer being is fabricated for our use. To see this we only have to name the entities we encounter, houses, plans, organisations, strategies and so forth, but also all the tools we use and the objects around us, hammers, books, paper, laptops. The mode of being of these items is what Heidegger terms 'ready-to-hand' (zuhanden); they have their being as useful for us (Heidegger, 1962: 98).

Another sort of being Heidegger reserves for those objects to which we have not attributed a being for our use. Such being he terms 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden, Heidegger, 1962: 103). These present-at-hand entities, or objects, are thing-like. Entities that are ready-to-hand typically become thing-like when they are broken, as with a broken hammer which devolves to pieces of wood and metal (see Mulhall, 2013: 58). Thus it is not that some things are 'ready-to-hand' and others are 'present-at-hand' rather a particular thing may be occurring/and thus being 'ready-to-hand' at one moment but could at another moment be occurring/and thus being 'present-at hand'. Many planners will understand the truth of this, because they actively alter the occurring of things all the time. The approach of the scientific gaze renders things 'thing-like' (objects subject to objective analysis), under this gaze things occur as 'objects' and we become a thing that is observing them.

Finally, in turning to the matter of the relationship of how those that are aware of being (Dasein – the one that is there) are to others of its kind, Heidegger insists that we must not make the mistake of starting from an isolated 'I'. To characterise this relationship Heidegger introduces another term marking a mode of being, Being-with (Heidegger, 1962: 154, 157). Being-with is the kind of being we share collectively with those which occur as also creating an occurring world: our fellow Daseins. Collectively those which create an occurring world come to an agreement about that which 'is' sufficient to allow society to function. This collective, agreed 'is-ness' is the always already world, the creation of das Man (the 'they')¹. The market is perhaps now its most familiar manifestation, an occurring world in which we find ourselves dissolved, being without intent. Entities which occur as capable of being-with are provided room to present themselves 'as they are', or at least as they would occur for themselves.

In Heidegger's terms, then, the being of the world, or the is-ness of the world, is given by its occurring. Being occurs as ready-to-hand, present-at-hand, or being-with. For example something like the environment can occur as present to hand (Vorhandene) when it occurs as 'that which we are in', or as ready to hand (Zuhandene) when we search the Amazon for cancer curing plants, or able to create its own occurring world (to be-with) when an environmentalist experiences it as itself. However we are also given being by the occurring of the world. When the environment is present to hand so to are we, when it is an object of exploitation so are we, when it can create it is experienced as itself, so to are we. That is to say what occurs (the occurring of everything) is perfect correlation with the being to which it occurs. Who we are being provides a world view from which what it is logical, necessary or possible to do is derived, and with which our actions are in perfect accord. When we learn to distinguish the world in particular configurations, they are said to have 'become' something, for example a planner.

Arendt (Arendt, 1998) posits that, at least in the past, the world could be understood as fabricated by humans (the one that is there). In this discussion she is pointing to the phenomena that Heidegger observed, albeit from only one direction – the creation of the world, rather than including in the world who we are being. In her view fabrication is the act of bringing into being an object which is already envisaged, an object which is designed to hold an envisagement of the world through its existence (Arendt, 1958). Such objects include tables, institutions, and persons of historical significance. Arendt considers this fabrication critical to the human condition, because it is these fabrications which hold us apart, make us distinct, or distinctive, giving us distinctive differences. Not only giving us identity (when we fabricate

¹ In German 'man' is the neuter 'one' as in what 'one thinks' – man glaubt, but when capitalised as Man by Heidegger it usually translated as 'the they'.

ourselves) but also giving us a way to see the world which is shared, and embedded enough so we can function without having to invent everything all the time.

Taken this way, Arendt could be taken to be talking about the process through which humans in a society create shared understandings of what things are. That if we are viewing a table as ready to hand, there is a generalised understanding of what that means one can do. For example sit at it, put things on top of it, not stand on it. Alternatively if we are viewing a table as present at hand, then it is an object to be moved around, not bumped into, judged by its aesthetic value.

Like Heidegger, Arendt suggests that these generalised understandings are reached through the development of a 'conversation of the they', a thrown way of being. This they-ness to use Heidegger's term is the way everyone understands something. It is the automatic mode of being, into which all inauthentic beings can be pulled (for more on this see (Low & Sturup, 2017)), but it can be transformed if a person does the work of thinking through for themselves what being to attribute to something (and thus themselves). We are arguing that an effective strategic plan generates a way of being in the world which is held in the automatic interpretations that arise in relation to the fabricated world. It becomes part of the thrown way of being. Because in that way what there is to do is automatic. Each person doesn't have to generate the being over and over.

Importantly Arendt suggested that the fabricated world needs a ground on which to be maintained. She suggested that in the past there has been a public realm in which humans can fabricate themselves as public beings, beings which they come to be known as, and have a kind of historical longevity. This public realm is also the space in which humans come to create and maintain the distinction between one another.

3 THE LOSS OF THE PUBLIC REALM

The public realm was the place where a person could fabricate themselves in some sort of permanent way. The promise of the public realm was posterity, it provided the space whereby one could speak oneself into existence, and be held to account for that speaking. Acting and speaking in the public realm needed to be in alignment, so that the observed would be interpreted as who they were speaking themselves to be. Arendt's (1958) proposal is that the public realm has been replaced with a 'social' world. The social world is one that allows complete and ongoing creation of the self, without any prior envisaging of who we might be. It is a world which displaces any relationship between the social self and the fabricated world in which human society functions and is maintained with any longevity. As a result we obtain freedom to construct and reconstruct ourselves, but we also lose the capacity to maintain that self except in the moment of our saying it. The world no longer maintains the identity we constructed for ourselves. If we wish to maintain an identity without the effort of saying it, our only choice is to choose an acceptable label, so that we end up feeling as though we were constructed by something other than ourselves.

In losing the public realm we have lost the space that held our self-constructions beyond the moment of our speaking them. Accordingly we have also lost the space that held our social-constructions beyond the moment of our saying them. The social self is constructed, but in such a way that any accountability or authenticity for that self lies at a place so removed from us that we might as well be something external to ourselves or something that we cannot control (the other). Although some argue that the lynchpin of liberal democracy, namely the nation state and its democratic forums, which provide a means for the formation of the long term public interest remain intact (Streeck, 2014: 40), it seems increasingly the case that they are becoming empty shells, unfilled by any who is willing to speak themselves into existence, and none that would hear them even if they did.

4 EVIDENCE OF THE PROBLEM

Arendt (1958: 55) argues that the public realm has been lost. She foresaw consequences which we increasingly see appearing. 'Only the existence of a public realm and the world's subsequent transformation into a community of things which gathers men together and relates them to each other depends entirely on permanence. If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one

generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of mortal men'. Individualization and privatization results in a condition of 'worldlessness'.

To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them (Arendt, 1958: 43-44).same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them (Arendt, 1958: 43-44).same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them (Arendt, 1958: 43-44).

These things that Arendt is referring to were fabricated, created by humans with the purpose of holding certain world views. Wagner (2012: 65) identifies such fabrications that emphasised, variously, structure and social class, system and function, culture and nation, and procedure, law and state presenting 'objectivist pictures of society that rested on the idea of strong ties between human beings guaranteeing coherence and a stable socio-political order'. Beginning in the late 1960s, he argues, the cogent critique of each one of these pictures made any idea of a stable collective order increasingly untenable, so that 'the emergence and assertion of the individual as a being without pre-determined strong connections to or within collectivities has moved to the centre of sociological interest'. Thus, from a sociological perspective, Wagner is reflecting on the same tendency that Arendt observed earlier from a political-philosophical perspective, the replacement of a public realm with a social one.

We can see the results today in flash mob behaviour where collective expression – be it condemnation, approbation or just assembly – comes and goes in a flash beyond which little endures. In the 'social' world gone is the 'communistic fiction' (in Arendt's term) that there is a natural harmony of interests in society, whether that be expressed through the 'workers' political party or through the invisible hand of the market – or, one might add, through some sort of pluralistic process (Arendt, 1958: 43-44).

Under these circumstances, the worldhood of planning has 'splintered' (Graham and Marvin, 2001) there is no ground upon which to create a collective vision, and nothing to 'hold' it in existence. Planners are thrown back on their own resources of interpretation and judgement to create a vision even while acknowledging its illegitimacy. The alternative is to attempt to create an expression of collective need and the long term public welfare, even while at the same time there seems no solid ground upon which to maintain this collective understanding. In the social world each person retains the right to their own world view, and to change that construction on a daily or hourly basis, even our mode of construction acknowledges this as tweeting has replaced even the news sound bite as the preferred vehicle for our construction. In such conditions, agreement to a collective world view - let alone one that extends into a time frame relevant to planning horizons - seems impossible.

While it seems as though we have lost the public realm, and that there is thus no ground upon which to build strategic planning, there are places in the world which seem to have managed to plant and grow fruit from their strategic plans. One such place is Copenhagen where the strategic five finger plan of 1947 seems to have survived various iterations. We observe that it survives through a deeply embedded set of rationalities which manifest themselves both in the statements of people doing planning, and the understanding of fabrications being undertaken. For example when Copenhagen sought to expand the urban fabric into Ørestad it was understood that a rail line would be required because 'no-one would develop high density living without access to a railway'. Consequently the Copenhagen metro was built. This logic continues in the development of the outer ring tram project, and anticipated extensions of the metro to Nordhavn.

There are many such examples, such as London's seemingly sacrosanct 'green belt'(Thomas, 1970), or the Randstad in the Netherlands (Salet, Bertolini, & Giezen, 2013), although few have been analysed in terms of the position held in this article. Although the foundations of these strategic principles may have

been laid at a time when the public realm gave them stability, what holds them in place now? Perhaps they too are under increasing threat, remaining only because they are deeply embedded unconsciousness. Perhaps their guardians understand this at some level and thus resist subjecting them to conscious consideration. More likely in our view, there is some insight to be gained from the way that these strategic principles are manifest both in the (un)conscious use of rationalities, the types of knowledge brought to bear on them, and in the built fabric of cities.

5 DISCUSSION

Built into the definition of strategic planning is the notion of transformation, or put another way, the idea of an authentic construction of something. We have shown that it is in the fabrication of things, and their associated occurring that we construct what is and what we are. Whatever might be said today about the prescriptions of Howard (1946), Le Corbusier (1971), Geddes (1968), Jacobs (1963) and others of their times, they each spoke themselves and a new world into existence. This is the essential importance of strategic planning, it is a fabrication that reminds us of our capacity to invent the future, and indeed the world.

Our capacity to invent the world arises in being-with. When others are present this implies the need to develop a socially constructed understanding of what is there. This agreed world, is what Heidegger called 'the they', the world that we by default find ourselves in if we do not invent who we are. The thrown world is very like the 'social' world that Arendt refers to. The one in which, rather than distinguishing ourselves within, we merge into. 'absorption in "the they" means that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted' (Heidegger, 1962: 264). We are always immersed in an ocean of public communication in which 'proximally and for the most part Dasein is absorbed in the "they" and is mastered by it' (Heidegger, 1962: 210). This idea approximates that of 'stories' or 'storylines' about which much has been written in the planning literature (Hajer, 1995; Sandercock, 2003). To find truth in these stories requires that we are reminded that they are stories and that we are the story teller.

But being-with is the kind of being that creates choice in how the world is constructed. Heidegger (1962: 165) suggests a possibility for authenticity, 'a clearing away of concealments and obscurities' which makes possible a self-invention. Taken together with Arendt's ideas of fabrication – the embedding of notions of what something is within the material things this suggests that strategic planning will be most effective when it combines the social construction of what is desired (perhaps through consultative planning), with appropriate constructions in our cities. As we have noted above, this fabrication needs time. Time in which the rationalities for what we are doing can become embedded in that which we create, what being it is granted and how it is then used.

We have seen that the social realm (for all the promise of freedom that it fulfils) is not very good at holding things constant. What then are our options? Can we renew the public realm or can we create a new kind of public realm that consciously holds particular 'sayings' of the world to account. There are of course good reasons to have reduced the public realm. Doing so has broken apart old conceptions of many labels (woman, man, landholder, lord, etc) and given us freedom to create our own conceptions of the groups to which we belong – indeed of what we are. But we have lost a significant level of stability in the process. Could we reinvent that stability for just some 'authentically' generated social realities? Doing so would require a new level of engagement by those who generate the plan. Not only would they be required to be consulted, but they would need to become the 'owners' of the plan, the custodians of the rationality, the logic behind what will be done. Like the one that holds the board in place while the other hammers it into place, those that agitate for something would need to hold it steady until it will stand up on its own. This would require a new set of skills, and a longevity for groups that protest.

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper we have demonstrated the occurring world is based on the three types of being; being present at hand, being ready to hand and being with. We have seen that strategic plans should be created in the plurality of beings which have the capacity to generate an occurring world. Those with whom it is possible to be with. We have seen that this being with can result in a social world, one in which it is

possible to merge and lose oneself. But we have also seen that we retain the capacity for authenticity. We can create an occurring world which aligns our experience and in which we can express some generated self. This fabrication of ourselves requires no more nor less than our willingness to speak it, and a set of people to listen to it. This can be done in a social world, indeed we are freer to do so than ever, because the social world does not hold us to account. Tomorrow we can say ourselves anew and who would gainsay us? If we are no more than who we say we are, why not change that as we would?

The public realm, the realm we have lost, is the place where what we say develops an existence of its own. In losing it we have lost the ability to fabricate a world that lasts beyond the saying of it. The institutions which used to hold the world in some sense fixed, that mediated which sayings would last and which would not, have disappeared. Nothing lasts, all is mutable, 'all that is solid melts into air' (Berman 1982). The lack of a public realm expands the complexity of planning, because the public realm is what provides the ground for a lasting collective vision. Just as we seem on the edge of solving the question of how to create a valid, pluralist vision, the ground in which such a vision could be planted and expected to grow has blown away like so much dust. The question then becomes who will hold the vision while it is fabricated into the entities occurring as present to hand, and ready to hand. Who will generate the stories of what is present to hand and what is ready to hand that will fix a certain occurring into what is fabricated? Since we have lost the institutions of nation states, and liberal democracy, we can no longer rely on the old structures of the public realm. Perhaps instead coalitions brought into existence for the purpose of creating a vision, must also take up the burden of carrying that vision, and ensuring it is embedded in an occurring world that lasts beyond one human saying.

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ID 1543 | SHAPING SPACES OF INTERACTION FOR SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITIONS

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1 INTRODUCTION

Cities are complex environments where different actors and stakeholders co-exist and learn how to live together. Within these complex environments, different types of citizens initiatives are arising that we consider to be important starting points for achieving urban transformations to sustainability (Niki Frantzeskaki et al., 2016). These kind of initiatives, typically enacted by social entrepreneurs, civic volunteers, local activists, freelance civil servants etc., are challenging the traditional ways of city making through which urban services, spaces and buildings are usually developed through policy and planning. They seem to stimulate the rise of several new types of interactions between citizens, entrepreneurs and freelance civil servants but so far are hardly facilitated and linked to urban planning in a systematic way. Such interactions can be considered as transformative social innovations (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016) that redefine the relations and interactions between actors to realize sustainable alternatives contributing to wider transitions. These transformative initiatives can be nurtured, developed, replicated, or complemented in protected environments and are often seen as part of a broader transition movement (Gorissen, Vrancken, & Manshoven, 2016). Those transformative initiatives are triggering the rise of spaces for the interaction between different stakeholders in urban environment, which is a key element of participatory city making. This paper aims to explore the role of planning in participatory city making. It connects complexity in planning and transition theory in order to describe the space of the interaction between the different urban stakeholders.

2 TRANSITIONS IN CITY MAKING

Participation and interaction of different actors and stakeholders has always been a hot topic in planning research. The discussions about the necessity to include more actors in the planning process resulted in governance replacing government in planning discourses and practices. Following different paradigms emerged; such as traditional public administration, new public management and networked governance (Hartley, 2005). Consequently, new approaches were developed, i.e. the inclusion of private actors in different types of collaboration and partnerships in "making" the urban realm or in providing urban public services (R.C. Holland, 1984). Emphasis arose on the emerging role of citizens and communities in city making, this spread during the XXI century (Majamaa, 2008; Zhang & Kumaraswamy, 2011). What these diverse approaches have in common, is the willingness to open-up the decision making process to different stakeholders. While these approaches are developed in practice, also the academic discourse is repositioning the role of planning, highlighting how they moved from a technocratic practice to a communicative practice where planning is intended to enhance reaching consensus in decision making processes. Different modes of planning emerged from theories about urban and regional regimes (Hamilton, 2004), discursive and collaborative governance (Forester, 1989; Healey, 2007), relational geographies (Massey, 2005), agonism and institutional ambiguity (Bäcklund & Mäntyselä, 2010), and theories of spatial complexity (Portugali, Benenson, & Omer, 1994).

In the last years, there is a growing interest among planners to address complexity and its ongoing fluidity, openness, non-linearity and unpredictable development, considering this to be more in line with the reality of cities' development (Boelens & Roo, 2014; Roo & Boelens, 2014). Here, planners are questioning about